Windows Process Creation: Suspicious rundll32 Command-Line Invocations of Common DLL Entry Points
Detects rundll32 runs whose command lines reference specific DLL exports often abused for LOLBIN execution.
FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
windows-process-creation-suspicious-rundll32-command-line-invocations-of-common--e593cf51
title: "Windows Process Creation: Suspicious rundll32 Command-Line Invocations of Common DLL Entry Points"
id: 1f7169d9-e1a3-4ac4-89ad-3d9a91f4fe28
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where rundll32 is executed with command-line parameters that reference specific DLLs and known entry points consistent with LOLBIN-style execution. Attackers can use these DLL exports to proxy execution, reducing reliance on custom binaries and blending in with legitimate Windows component usage. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the full command line containing rundll32 and targeted DLL/function pairs, with several exclusions for common control-panel screensaver and CPL-driven patterns.
references:
- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/05/01/running-programs-via-proxy-jumping-on-a-edr-bypass-trampoline/
- https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885258886428725250
- https://gist.github.com/ryhanson/227229866af52e2d963cf941af135a52
- https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1433344116071583746
- https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1479106975967240209
- https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1479080793003671557
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_susp_activity.yml
author: juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-05-17
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- "javascript:"
- .RegisterXLL
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- url.dll
- OpenURL
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- url.dll
- OpenURLA
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- url.dll
- FileProtocolHandler
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- zipfldr.dll
- RouteTheCall
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- shell32.dll
- Control_RunDLL
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- shell32.dll
- ShellExec_RunDLL
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- mshtml.dll
- PrintHTML
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- advpack.dll
- LaunchINFSection
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- advpack.dll
- RegisterOCX
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ieadvpack.dll
- LaunchINFSection
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ieadvpack.dll
- RegisterOCX
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- ieframe.dll
- OpenURL
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- shdocvw.dll
- OpenURL
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- syssetup.dll
- SetupInfObjectInstallAction
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- setupapi.dll
- InstallHinfSection
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- pcwutl.dll
- LaunchApplication
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- dfshim.dll
- ShOpenVerbApplication
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- dfshim.dll
- ShOpenVerbShortcut
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- scrobj.dll
- GenerateTypeLib
- http
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- shimgvw.dll
- ImageView_Fullscreen
- http
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- comsvcs.dll
- MiniDump
filter_main_screensaver:
CommandLine|contains: shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL desk.cpl,screensaver,@screensaver
filter_main_parent_cpl:
ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\control.exe
ParentCommandLine|contains: .cpl
CommandLine|contains|all:
- Shell32.dll
- Control_RunDLL
- .cpl
filter_main_startmenu:
ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\control.exe
CommandLine|startswith: '"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" Shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL "C:\Windows\System32\'
CommandLine|endswith: .cpl",
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e593cf51-88db-4ee1-b920-37e89012a3c9
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags process creation events where rundll32 is executed with command-line parameters that reference specific DLLs and known entry points consistent with LOLBIN-style execution. Attackers can use these DLL exports to proxy execution, reducing reliance on custom binaries and blending in with legitimate Windows component usage. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the full command line containing rundll32 and targeted DLL/function pairs, with several exclusions for common control-panel screensaver and CPL-driven patterns.
Known false positives
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.