Windows Process Memory Dump via comsvcs.dll using rundll32
Alert on rundll32 loading comsvcs.dll with arguments consistent with a full process memory dump.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2020-02-18
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Defense Evasion → Cred AccessRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process executions where rundll32 loads comsvcs.dll to trigger a full process memory dump. Attackers use this technique to obtain sensitive in-memory data, supporting credential theft and other post-exploitation objectives. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the image name/original filename and command-line strings indicating comsvcs full dump behavior (including ordinal/function arguments).
Reporting behind it
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
- modexp.wordpress.comhttps://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
- github.comhttps://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
- youtube.comhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Process Memory Dump via comsvcs.dll using rundll32
id: ba2c0c1d-a0b5-4d47-897f-9cc302062434
related:
- id: 09e6d5c0-05b8-4ff8-9eeb-043046ec774c
type: obsolete
- id: 646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process executions where rundll32 loads comsvcs.dll to trigger a full process memory dump. Attackers use this technique to obtain sensitive in-memory data, supporting credential theft and other post-exploitation objectives. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the image name/original filename and command-line strings indicating comsvcs full dump behavior (including ordinal/function arguments).
references:
- https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
- https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
- https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
- https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
- https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-02-18
modified: 2025-02-23
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
- attack.t1003.001
- car.2013-05-009
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
- OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE
- CommandLine|contains: rundll32
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- comsvcs
- full
CommandLine|contains:
- "#-"
- "#+"
- "#24"
- "24 "
- MiniDump
- "#65560"
selection_generic:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- "24"
- comsvcs
- full
CommandLine|contains:
- " #"
- ",#"
- ", #"
- '"#'
condition: (selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*) or selection_generic
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1