Windows file creation of executable/script files in \Users\Public

Alerts on Windows file creation in \Users\Public\ with potentially malicious script/binary extensions.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: file_event
Author: The DFIR Report (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2025-01-23
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1204User Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies the creation of files in the Windows public user directory (\Users\Public) with extensions commonly used for executable and script content (.bat, .dll, .exe, .hta, .js, .ps1, .vbe, .vbs). Placing such payloads in a widely accessible folder can support execution, staging, or lateral access by increasing discoverability and reach. It relies on file event telemetry that records the target filename during file creation.

Reporting behind it

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Windows file creation of executable/script files in \Users\Public

Pivot detection · T1204 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-public-folder-file-creation-with-suspicious-script-or-binary-extensions-b447f7de

title: Windows file creation of executable/script files in \Users\Public
id: bc7bb988-6da9-48d0-8222-fdfbdae2859e
status: experimental
description: This rule identifies the creation of files in the Windows public user directory (\Users\Public) with extensions commonly used for executable and script content (.bat, .dll, .exe, .hta, .js, .ps1, .vbe, .vbs). Placing such payloads in a widely accessible folder can support execution, staging, or lateral access by increasing discoverability and reach. It relies on file event telemetry that records the target filename during file creation.
references:
  - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/events/view/30032
  - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/eventReports/view/70
  - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/01/27/cobalt-strike-and-a-pair-of-socks-lead-to-lockbit-ransomware/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_public_folder_extension.yml
author: The DFIR Report, Huntrule Team
date: 2025-01-23
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204
logsource:
  category: file_event
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|contains: :\Users\Public\
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - .bat
      - .dll
      - .exe
      - .hta
      - .js
      - .ps1
      - .vbe
      - .vbs
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrators deploying legitimate binaries to public folders.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_public_folder_extension/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: b447f7de-1e53-4cbf-bfb4-f1f6d0b04e4e
    type: derived

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