Windows RDP Logon Using Localhost IP Address

Alerts on successful Windows logons (EventID 4624, LogonType 10) originating from localhost IPs.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
Thomas Patzke (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2019-01-28
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags successful Windows logon events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 10 where the source IP is localhost (127.0.0.1 or ::1). Localhost-sourced RDP sessions are often suspicious because they can indicate tunneling or proxying to make the connection appear local. It relies on Windows Security auditing telemetry capturing the logon event details, including LogonType and IpAddress.

Related detections9 linkedT1021.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Enabling of Remote Desktop via fDenyTSConnections Registry by DeadLock Ransomware
Suspicious Plink SSH Tunnel Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Remote Desktop Enabled via fDenyTSConnections Registry by Sandworm
Suspicious RDP Shadow Session Started - Native (via rdp)
Malicious RDP BlueeKeep Connection Closed - CVE-2019-0708 (via rdp)
Obfuscated RDP Tunneling Configuration Enabled for Port Forwarding (via process_creation)
Malicious RDP Shadow Session Configuration Enabled - Registry (via registry_event)
Malicious RDP Tunneling (via rdp)
Suspicious Denied RDP Login with Valid Credentials (via security)
Windows RDP Logon Using Localhost IP Address
Pivot detection · T1021.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
  1. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.