Windows Registry Change: ServiceDll Path Ending in \CurrentControlSet\Services\wercplsupport\Parameters\ServiceDll
Alerts on Windows registry writes to a specific Services\wercplsupport\Parameters\ServiceDll target path.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-registry-change-servicedll-path-ending-in-currentcontrolset-services-wer-92b0b372
title: "Windows Registry Change: ServiceDll Path Ending in \\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\wercplsupport\\Parameters\\ServiceDll"
id: 686c23c3-314a-442c-82e1-6d0948d0b890
related:
- id: c3198a27-23a0-4c2c-af19-e5328d49680e
type: derived
- id: 92b0b372-a939-44ed-a11b-5136cf680e27
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows registry writes where the TargetObject ends with the specific Services\wercplsupport\Parameters\ServiceDll path. Attackers can use ServiceDll settings to establish persistence by redirecting service DLL loading, or to impair defenses via unauthorized service-related configuration changes. Detection relies on registry-set telemetry that records the TargetObject value for each registry modification event.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2020/Malware/Blue-Mockingbird/registry_set_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-05-14
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1047
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: \CurrentControlSet\Services\wercplsupport\Parameters\ServiceDll
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags Windows registry writes where the TargetObject ends with the specific Services\wercplsupport\Parameters\ServiceDll path. Attackers can use ServiceDll settings to establish persistence by redirecting service DLL loading, or to impair defenses via unauthorized service-related configuration changes. Detection relies on registry-set telemetry that records the TargetObject value for each registry modification event.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.