Windows Registry: Clearing RDP Client Connection History via MRU and Server Keys Deletion
Flags registry deletions that remove Windows RDP client connection history from Terminal Server Client MRU and Servers keys.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- registry_delete
- Author
- Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2021-10-19
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule detects Windows registry value and key deletions tied to Terminal Server Client connection history, specifically entries under the Default\MRU and Servers paths. Clearing these records can be used to reduce forensic visibility of previously accessed remote desktop hosts and sessions. It relies on registry deletion telemetry indicating either DeleteValue or DeleteKey events targeting matching registry paths.
Reporting behind it
- learn.microsoft.comhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/remote/remove-entries-from-remote-desktop-connection-computer
- woshub.comhttp://woshub.com/how-to-clear-rdp-connections-history/
- trendmicro.comhttps://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/vice-society-ransomware-group-targets-manufacturing-companies.html
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_mstsc_history_cleared.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Registry: Clearing RDP Client Connection History via MRU and Server Keys Deletion"
id: bdfc5b02-7c27-4d33-a19b-808b835eaf08
status: test
description: This rule detects Windows registry value and key deletions tied to Terminal Server Client connection history, specifically entries under the Default\MRU and Servers paths. Clearing these records can be used to reduce forensic visibility of previously accessed remote desktop hosts and sessions. It relies on registry deletion telemetry indicating either DeleteValue or DeleteKey events targeting matching registry paths.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/remote/remove-entries-from-remote-desktop-connection-computer
- http://woshub.com/how-to-clear-rdp-connections-history/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/vice-society-ransomware-group-targets-manufacturing-companies.html
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_mstsc_history_cleared.yml
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-10-19
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1070
- attack.t1112
logsource:
category: registry_delete
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
EventType: DeleteValue
TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\MRU
selection2:
EventType: DeleteKey
TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 07bdd2f5-9c58-4f38-aec8-e101bb79ef8d
type: derived