Windows renamed dctask64.exe execution via known IMPHASH values
Flags Windows process creations where a renamed dctask64.exe execution matches known IMPHASH values.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2020-01-28
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Priv Esc → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies process executions where the binary hash matches one of several known IMPHASH values associated with a renamed dctask64.exe (ZOHO ManageEngine Endpoint Central) execution. Renaming trusted system or vendor binaries can help attackers evade name-based detection and blend into legitimate activity. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry containing the process image path/name and the IMPHASH field to match these specific indicators while excluding cases with a matching legitimate name pattern.
Reporting behind it
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_dctask64.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows renamed dctask64.exe execution via known IMPHASH values
id: 501cb7a3-e60f-4c3b-b025-e8b01e14b01a
status: test
description: This rule identifies process executions where the binary hash matches one of several known IMPHASH values associated with a renamed dctask64.exe (ZOHO ManageEngine Endpoint Central) execution. Renaming trusted system or vendor binaries can help attackers evade name-based detection and blend into legitimate activity. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry containing the process image path/name and the IMPHASH field to match these specific indicators while excluding cases with a matching legitimate name pattern.
references:
- https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540
- https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296
- https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_dctask64.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-01-28
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
- attack.t1055.001
- attack.t1202
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Hashes|contains:
- IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD
- IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA
- IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3
- IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF
filter_main_legit_name:
Image|endswith: \dctask64.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 340a090b-c4e9-412e-bb36-b4b16fe96f9b
type: derived