Windows rundll32.exe launched via LOLBin chain from cmd/cscript/powershell/mshta
Alerts on rundll32.exe execution with DLL arguments from common Windows script/LOLBins and suspicious staging paths.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-rundll32-exe-launched-via-lolbin-chain-from-cmd-cscript-powershell-mshta-cf879ffb
title: Windows rundll32.exe launched via LOLBin chain from cmd/cscript/powershell/mshta
id: 15fd2ecb-d739-4ac1-93f0-61aab0f29017
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where rundll32.exe is executed with a command line containing paths commonly abused for staging and includes a DLL reference. It requires the parent process to be one of several scripting/command interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, cscript.exe, powershell/pwsh, mshta, curl, or wscript), matching a behavior pattern often used to load malicious code via DLL execution. Telemetry relied on includes process creation logs with parent/child image paths and command-line content.
references:
- https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2023/Malware/Qakbot/proc_creation_win_malware_qakbot_rundll32_execution.yml
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-05-24
tags:
- attack.execution
- detection.emerging-threats
- attack.stealth
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_paths:
ParentImage|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \curl.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \wscript.exe
Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- :\ProgramData\
- :\Users\Public\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \AppData\Roaming\
selection_extension:
CommandLine|contains: .dll
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: cf879ffb-793a-4753-9a14-bc8f37cc90df
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where rundll32.exe is executed with a command line containing paths commonly abused for staging and includes a DLL reference. It requires the parent process to be one of several scripting/command interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, cscript.exe, powershell/pwsh, mshta, curl, or wscript), matching a behavior pattern often used to load malicious code via DLL execution. Telemetry relied on includes process creation logs with parent/child image paths and command-line content.
Known false positives
- Unlikely
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.