Windows schtasks.exe Create Executes File from AppData\Local
Alerts on schtasks.exe creating tasks that run payloads from C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-03-15
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags process executions of schtasks.exe that create a scheduled task to run an executable located under a user’s AppData\Local path. Attackers commonly use Task Scheduler for persistence and execution by placing payloads in per-user application data directories and then scheduling them to run under a high-privilege account. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching schtasks.exe command-line arguments that include /Create, /RU, /TR, and an AppData\Local target.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows schtasks.exe Create Executes File from AppData\Local
id: 547305eb-c975-4de7-8f6b-39a1a3fd1fe1
status: test
description: This rule flags process executions of schtasks.exe that create a scheduled task to run an executable located under a user’s AppData\Local path. Attackers commonly use Task Scheduler for persistence and execution by placing payloads in per-user application data directories and then scheduling them to run under a high-privilege account. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching schtasks.exe command-line arguments that include /Create, /RU, /TR, and an AppData\Local target.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_appdata_local_system.yml
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-03-15
modified: 2022-07-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- /Create
- /RU
- /TR
- C:\Users\
- \AppData\Local\
CommandLine|contains:
- NT AUT
- " SYSTEM "
filter:
ParentImage|contains|all:
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- TeamViewer_.exe
Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe
CommandLine|contains: /TN TVInstallRestore
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: c5c00f49-b3f9-45a6-997e-cfdecc6e1967
type: derived