Windows Schtasks.exe renamed execution used to create, modify, run, or delete scheduled tasks
Alerts on scheduled task management commands that use a renamed schtasks.exe binary on Windows.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2025-11-27
- Updated
- 2026-10-03
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags process creation events where the executed image ends with \schtasks.exe or the process original file name is schtasks.exe, while the command line includes schtasks-related operations such as /create, /delete, /query, /change, /run, or /end. Renaming schtasks.exe can help attackers blend into expected tooling while using it for persistence via scheduled tasks. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including Image, OriginalFileName, and CommandLine, and excludes cases involving openfiles queries.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v3- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-10-03
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Schtasks.exe renamed execution used to create, modify, run, or delete scheduled tasks
id: 2179894d-58fa-461e-913d-9a61201f3014
status: experimental
description: This rule flags process creation events where the executed image ends with \schtasks.exe or the process original file name is schtasks.exe, while the command line includes schtasks-related operations such as /create, /delete, /query, /change, /run, or /end. Renaming schtasks.exe can help attackers blend into expected tooling while using it for persistence via scheduled tasks. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including Image, OriginalFileName, and CommandLine, and excludes cases involving openfiles queries.
references:
- https://x.com/JangPr0/status/1932034543026065833
- https://ss64.com/nt/schtasks.html
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_schtasks_execution.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-11-27
modified: 2026-10-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.003
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cmd_operation:
CommandLine|contains|windash:
- " /create "
- " /delete "
- " /query "
- " /change "
- " /run "
- " /end "
selection_cmd_flags:
CommandLine|contains|windash:
- " /tn "
- " /tr "
- " /sc "
- " /st "
- " /ru "
- " /fo "
selection_pe:
OriginalFileName: schtasks.exe
filter_main_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: schtasks
filter_main_img:
Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe
filter_optional_cmd_openfiles:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- openfiles
- " /query "
- " /fo"
condition: (all of selection_cmd_* and not filter_main_cmd and not filter_optional_cmd_openfiles) or (selection_pe and not filter_main_img)
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_schtasks_execution/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: f91e51c9-f344-4b32-969b-0b6f6b8537d4
type: derived