Windows Security 4673: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Used to Load/Unload Kernel Drivers
Flags Windows Event 4673 instances where SeLoadDriverPrivilege is exercised, suggesting attempts to load or unload kernel-mode drivers.
FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
windows-security-4673-seloaddriverprivilege-used-to-load-unload-kernel-drivers-f63508a0
title: "Windows Security 4673: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Used to Load/Unload Kernel Drivers"
id: 988ced64-ea12-4e7d-8a03-3ea28331cc23
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows Security Event ID 4673 where the PrivilegeList includes SeLoadDriverPrivilege, indicating a process attempted an operation requiring the right to load or unload device drivers. Such activity matters because attackers may use driver loading capabilities to execute code in kernel mode. The detection relies on Security audit telemetry that logs privilege use for Event ID 4673 and filters out several common, known process paths from the match scope.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_driver_loaded.yml
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_1:
EventID: 4673
PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege
Service: "-"
filter_main_exact:
ProcessName:
- C:\Windows\explorer.exe
- C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe
- C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe
filter_optional_others:
ProcessName|endswith:
- \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe
- \Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
- \procexp.exe
- \procexp64.exe
- \procexp64a.exe
- \procmon.exe
- \procmon64.exe
- \procmon64a.exe
filter_main_startswith:
ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft
filter_optional_dropbox:
ProcessName|startswith:
- C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\
- C:\Program Files\Dropbox\
ProcessName|endswith: \Dropbox.exe
condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612
type: derived
What it detects
This rule identifies Windows Security Event ID 4673 where the PrivilegeList includes SeLoadDriverPrivilege, indicating a process attempted an operation requiring the right to load or unload device drivers. Such activity matters because attackers may use driver loading capabilities to execute code in kernel mode. The detection relies on Security audit telemetry that logs privilege use for Event ID 4673 and filters out several common, known process paths from the match scope.
Known false positives
- Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.