Windows Security Event 4673: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Use by Non-Whitelisted Processes

Flags Windows Event 4673 instances where SeLoadDriverPrivilege is exercised, suggesting attempts to load or unload kernel-mode drivers.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Service: security
Author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2019-04-08
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Security Event ID 4673 entries where the PrivilegeList includes SeLoadDriverPrivilege, indicating an attempt to load or unload a device driver. Such activity can enable attackers to introduce kernel-mode code, making it a high-value behavior to monitor. It relies on Windows Security audit events containing PrivilegeList values and correlates them with process names to exclude common/benign processes via allow filters.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Vulnerable Intel Ethernet Driver Load for BYOVD via SCATTERED SPIDER (via driver_load)

Malicious Defender Disable And Executable Exclusion Via Registry

Malicious UAC Disable via EnableLUA Registry Modification (via registry_set)

Malicious AMSI and ETW Patching via PowerShell Script

Malicious PowMix AMSI Bypass via amsiInitFailed

Suspicious ThrottleStop Driver Abuse for Defense Evasion in Ransomware Attacks

Malicious Disabling of Microsoft Defender Real-Time Protection via SystemSettingsAdminFlows by DeadLock Ransomware

Suspicious Security Software Uninstallation via WMIC Product Call Uninstall (Chaos Ransomware)

Suspicious Security Product Uninstall via wmic product call uninstall

Windows Security Event 4673: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Use by Non-Whitelisted Processes

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-security-4673-seloaddriverprivilege-used-to-load-unload-kernel-drivers-f63508a0

title: "Windows Security Event 4673: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Use by Non-Whitelisted Processes"
id: 988ced64-ea12-4e7d-8a03-3ea28331cc23
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security Event ID 4673 entries where the PrivilegeList includes SeLoadDriverPrivilege, indicating an attempt to load or unload a device driver. Such activity can enable attackers to introduce kernel-mode code, making it a high-value behavior to monitor. It relies on Windows Security audit events containing PrivilegeList values and correlates them with process names to exclude common/benign processes via allow filters.
references:
  - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_driver_loaded.yml
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection_1:
    EventID: 4673
    PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege
    Service: "-"
  filter_main_exact:
    ProcessName:
      - C:\Windows\explorer.exe
      - C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe
      - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe
      - C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe
  filter_optional_others:
    ProcessName|endswith:
      - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe
      - \Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
      - \procexp.exe
      - \procexp64.exe
      - \procexp64a.exe
      - \procmon.exe
      - \procmon64.exe
      - \procmon64a.exe
  filter_main_startswith:
    ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft
  filter_optional_dropbox:
    ProcessName|startswith:
      - C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\
      - C:\Program Files\Dropbox\
    ProcessName|endswith: \Dropbox.exe
  condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
  - Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612
    type: derived

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