Windows Security: Suspicious Scheduled Task Update via Event ID 4702 Keywords

Alerts when a scheduled task is updated (EventID 4702) and the new task content includes suspicious execution keywords or temp/user paths.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Service: security
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-12-05
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Persistence
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Priv Esc
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags updates to scheduled tasks (EventID 4702) when the task’s new content includes paths consistent with common user-writable or temp locations and command-line keyword patterns associated with script or LOLBins-style execution. Attackers may modify scheduled tasks to persist or execute malicious commands at defined times, often blending into legitimate task management activity. It relies on Windows Security audit telemetry for scheduled task change events and inspects the embedded task content for both suspicious file paths and execution-related strings.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Security: Suspicious Scheduled Task Update via Event ID 4702 Keywords

Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-security-4702-scheduled-task-content-change-with-suspicious-strings-614cf376

title: "Windows Security: Suspicious Scheduled Task Update via Event ID 4702 Keywords"
id: 692602c3-c9df-4fff-aa3c-9200f95ef52f
related:
  - id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b
    type: similar
  - id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags updates to scheduled tasks (EventID 4702) when the task’s new content includes paths consistent with common user-writable or temp locations and command-line keyword patterns associated with script or LOLBins-style execution. Attackers may modify scheduled tasks to persist or execute malicious commands at defined times, often blending into legitimate task management activity. It relies on Windows Security audit telemetry for scheduled task change events and inspects the embedded task content for both suspicious file paths and execution-related strings.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_scheduled_task_update.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-12-05
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  definition: The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.
detection:
  selection_eid:
    EventID: 4702
  selection_paths:
    TaskContentNew|contains:
      - \AppData\Local\Temp\
      - \AppData\Roaming\
      - \Users\Public\
      - \WINDOWS\Temp\
      - C:\Temp\
      - \Desktop\
      - \Downloads\
      - \Temporary Internet
      - C:\ProgramData\
      - C:\Perflogs\
  selection_commands:
    TaskContentNew|contains:
      - regsvr32
      - rundll32
      - cmd.exe</Command>
      - cmd</Command>
      - "<Arguments>/c "
      - "<Arguments>/k "
      - "<Arguments>/r "
      - powershell
      - pwsh
      - mshta
      - wscript
      - cscript
      - certutil
      - bitsadmin
      - bash.exe
      - "bash "
      - scrcons
      - "wmic "
      - wmic.exe
      - forfiles
      - scriptrunner
      - hh.exe
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

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