Windows Security 4769 Kerberoasting Precursor Query (RC4 TGT Service Requests)
Collects successful Windows 4769 RC4 service-ticket requests while excluding krbtgt and computer/service account patterns for kerberoasting triage.
FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
windows-security-4769-kerberoasting-precursor-query-rc4-tgt-service-requests-d04ae2b8
title: Windows Security 4769 Kerberoasting Precursor Query (RC4 TGT Service Requests)
id: 75f7d88a-be8c-4572-a3c2-746cf41005db
status: test
description: This rule gathers Windows Security events indicating successful Kerberos service ticket requests (EventID 4769) where the ticket encryption type is RC4 (0x17), a common prerequisite signal for kerberoasting activity. It narrows to requests whose ServiceName does not end with "krbtgt" and excludes service names ending with "$" as well as TargetUserName values containing "$@" to reduce benign Kerberos noise. It relies on Security log telemetry fields for EventID, status, TicketEncryptionType, ServiceName, and TargetUserName so follow-on analysis can determine suspicious request patterns across a short time window.
references:
- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/art_of_kerberoast/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3513
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_kerberoasting_activity.yml
author: "@kostastsale, Huntrule Team"
date: 2022-01-21
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4769
Status: "0x0"
TicketEncryptionType: "0x17"
filter_main_krbtgt:
ServiceName|endswith:
- krbtgt
- $
filter_main_machine_accounts:
TargetUserName|contains: $@
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legacy applications.
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: d04ae2b8-ad54-4de0-bd87-4bc1da66aa59
type: derived
What it detects
This rule gathers Windows Security events indicating successful Kerberos service ticket requests (EventID 4769) where the ticket encryption type is RC4 (0x17), a common prerequisite signal for kerberoasting activity. It narrows to requests whose ServiceName does not end with "krbtgt" and excludes service names ending with "$" as well as TargetUserName values containing "$@" to reduce benign Kerberos noise. It relies on Security log telemetry fields for EventID, status, TicketEncryptionType, ServiceName, and TargetUserName so follow-on analysis can determine suspicious request patterns across a short time window.
Known false positives
- Legacy applications.
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.