Windows Security: Network Share Access to Sensitive File Extensions

Alerts when Windows users access network-shared files with extensions commonly targeted for credential or data collection.

FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
title: "Windows Security: Network Share Access to Sensitive File Extensions"
id: a35e29fb-003b-435e-be57-840f2bd70043
related:
  - id: 286b47ed-f6fe-40b3-b3a8-35129acd43bc
    type: similar
  - id: 91c945bc-2ad1-4799-a591-4d00198a1215
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security events indicating access to network shares where the accessed object name ends with high-value/sensitive file extensions such as .bak, .dmp, .edb, .kirbi, .msg, .nsf, .pst, .ost, .rdp, and related types. Attackers may use these files to collect credentials, email data, or system/backup artifacts during discovery and collection. It relies on Windows Security EventID 5145 and matches the RelativeTargetName ending with the specified extensions.
references:
  - Internal Research
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml
author: Samir Bousseaden, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1039
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    RelativeTargetName|endswith:
      - .bak
      - .dmp
      - .edb
      - .kirbi
      - .msg
      - .nsf
      - .nst
      - .oab
      - .ost
      - .pst
      - .rdp
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
  - Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1

What it detects

This rule flags Windows Security events indicating access to network shares where the accessed object name ends with high-value/sensitive file extensions such as .bak, .dmp, .edb, .kirbi, .msg, .nsf, .pst, .ost, .rdp, and related types. Attackers may use these files to collect credentials, email data, or system/backup artifacts during discovery and collection. It relies on Windows Security EventID 5145 and matches the RelativeTargetName ending with the specified extensions.

Known false positives

  • Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
  • Users working with these data types or exchanging message files

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.