Windows Security: Network Share Access to Sensitive File Extensions
Alerts when Windows users access network-shared files with extensions commonly targeted for credential or data collection.
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windows-security-network-share-access-to-sensitive-file-extensions-91c945bc
title: "Windows Security: Network Share Access to Sensitive File Extensions"
id: a35e29fb-003b-435e-be57-840f2bd70043
related:
- id: 286b47ed-f6fe-40b3-b3a8-35129acd43bc
type: similar
- id: 91c945bc-2ad1-4799-a591-4d00198a1215
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows Security events indicating access to network shares where the accessed object name ends with high-value/sensitive file extensions such as .bak, .dmp, .edb, .kirbi, .msg, .nsf, .pst, .ost, .rdp, and related types. Attackers may use these files to collect credentials, email data, or system/backup artifacts during discovery and collection. It relies on Windows Security EventID 5145 and matches the RelativeTargetName ending with the specified extensions.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml
author: Samir Bousseaden, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1039
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145
RelativeTargetName|endswith:
- .bak
- .dmp
- .edb
- .kirbi
- .msg
- .nsf
- .nst
- .oab
- .ost
- .pst
- .rdp
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags Windows Security events indicating access to network shares where the accessed object name ends with high-value/sensitive file extensions such as .bak, .dmp, .edb, .kirbi, .msg, .nsf, .pst, .ost, .rdp, and related types. Attackers may use these files to collect credentials, email data, or system/backup artifacts during discovery and collection. It relies on Windows Security EventID 5145 and matches the RelativeTargetName ending with the specified extensions.
Known false positives
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.