Windows Service ImagePath Set to Non-Admin Controlled Directory
Alerts when a Windows service’s ImagePath is changed to a binary path under AppData or ProgramData.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- registry_set
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-05-02
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies registry changes where a Windows service’s ImagePath is set to a location within ProgramData or AppData-style user-controlled directories. Such paths can support staging, persistence, or privilege escalation if an attacker can influence or replace the referenced binaries. It relies on Windows registry set telemetry for TargetObject and Details fields containing ControlSet service ImagePath values pointing into those directories, while excluding several known benign services and well-known Defender/Zoom/MBAM installer patterns.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Service ImagePath Set to Non-Admin Controlled Directory
id: 24513b7a-c9d9-467f-abc4-71ec691bd0bb
related:
- id: c625c4c2-515d-407f-8bb6-456f65955669
type: obsolete
- id: 277dc340-0540-42e7-8efb-5ff460045e07
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies registry changes where a Windows service’s ImagePath is set to a location within ProgramData or AppData-style user-controlled directories. Such paths can support staging, persistence, or privilege escalation if an attacker can influence or replace the referenced binaries. It relies on Windows registry set telemetry for TargetObject and Details fields containing ControlSet service ImagePath values pointing into those directories, while excluding several known benign services and well-known Defender/Zoom/MBAM installer patterns.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_service_image_path_user_controlled_folder.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-05-02
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains|all:
- ControlSet
- \Services\
TargetObject|endswith: \ImagePath
Details|contains:
- :\ProgramData\
- \AppData\Local\
- \AppData\Roaming\
filter_optional_zoom:
TargetObject|contains: \Services\ZoomCptService
Details|contains: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Zoom\Support\CptService.exe
filter_optional_mbami:
TargetObject|contains: \Services\MBAMInstallerService
Details|contains|all:
- C:\Users\
- AppData\Local\Temp\MBAMInstallerService.exe
filter_main_windefend:
TargetObject|contains:
- \Services\WinDefend\
- \Services\MpKs
Details|contains: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1