Windows: SettingSyncHost.exe executing RoamDiag.cmd via cmd.exe /c -outputpath

Flags non-System32/SysWOW64 processes spawned by SettingSyncHost.exe running RoamDiag.cmd via cmd.exe /c -outputpath.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: "Windows: SettingSyncHost.exe executing RoamDiag.cmd via cmd.exe /c -outputpath"
id: 881e7040-ae74-43e6-bd87-a7f807f964e1
status: test
description: This rule identifies process executions where SettingSyncHost.exe is the parent for a command line that includes cmd.exe /c, RoamDiag.cmd, and -outputpath. It also excludes cases where the child process image is located under standard Windows System32 or SysWOW64 paths. Attackers may abuse SettingSyncHost.exe as a trusted execution path to run a hijacked or unintended binary, so unexpected parent-child command line combinations matter for persistence and stealth. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically parent command line content and the child process image path.
references:
  - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/02/settingsynchost-exe-as-a-lolbin
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_settingsynchost.yml
author: Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-02-05
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1574.008
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  system_utility:
    Image|startswith:
      - C:\Windows\System32\
      - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
  parent_is_settingsynchost:
    ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
      - cmd.exe /c
      - RoamDiag.cmd
      - -outputpath
  condition: not system_utility and parent_is_settingsynchost
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: b2ddd389-f676-4ac4-845a-e00781a48e5f
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule identifies process executions where SettingSyncHost.exe is the parent for a command line that includes cmd.exe /c, RoamDiag.cmd, and -outputpath. It also excludes cases where the child process image is located under standard Windows System32 or SysWOW64 paths. Attackers may abuse SettingSyncHost.exe as a trusted execution path to run a hijacked or unintended binary, so unexpected parent-child command line combinations matter for persistence and stealth. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically parent command line content and the child process image path.

Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.