Windows: Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by HH.exe via Common LOLBins
Flags HH.exe spawning CertReq/CertUtil/CMD/PowerShell/cscript/regsvr32/mshta and other common Windows execution utilities.
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windows-suspicious-child-processes-spawned-by-hh-exe-via-common-lolbins-52cad028
title: "Windows: Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by HH.exe via Common LOLBins"
id: 5fe4fead-26d8-4d0b-88b3-0048c21fffe1
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows process creation events where Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe) spawns a child process from a list of commonly abused execution utilities and scripting hosts. Such parent/child relationships can indicate document-based execution chains and attacker-controlled living-off-the-land activity. Telemetry relies on Windows process creation fields for the parent image (ending with \hh.exe) and the child image (ending with one of the specified binaries).
references:
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hh_html_help_susp_child_process.yml
author: Maxim Pavlunin, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.t1218
- attack.t1218.001
- attack.t1218.010
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: \hh.exe
Image|endswith:
- \CertReq.exe
- \CertUtil.exe
- \cmd.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \installutil.exe
- \MSbuild.exe
- \MSHTA.EXE
- \msiexec.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \regsvr32.exe
- \rundll32.exe
- \schtasks.exe
- \wmic.exe
- \wscript.exe
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4
type: derived
What it detects
This rule identifies Windows process creation events where Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe) spawns a child process from a list of commonly abused execution utilities and scripting hosts. Such parent/child relationships can indicate document-based execution chains and attacker-controlled living-off-the-land activity. Telemetry relies on Windows process creation fields for the parent image (ending with \hh.exe) and the child image (ending with one of the specified binaries).
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.