Windows: Suspicious desktopimgdownldr Writes Lock Screen Images to Unusual Paths
Alerts on desktopimgdownldr-style lock screen image target writes to non-system paths with suspicious filename characteristics.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-suspicious-desktopimgdownldr-writes-lock-screen-images-to-unusual-paths-fc4f4817
title: "Windows: Suspicious desktopimgdownldr Writes Lock Screen Images to Unusual Paths"
id: cad72ede-7de6-4103-82a1-d92b40dcf0b4
status: test
description: This rule flags creation events where an Image file with the name ending in \svchost.exe targets a path under \Personalization\LockScreenImage\. It further narrows matches to instances where the target filename is neither within C:\Windows\ nor contains common image extensions such as .jpg, .jpeg, or .png. Attackers may misuse this type of native file handling to place payloads in user-facing locations and evade straightforward extension-based detections, making it important to correlate process-related image naming with target paths and filenames from file event telemetry.
references:
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_desktopimgdownldr_file.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \svchost.exe
TargetFilename|contains: \Personalization\LockScreenImage\
filter1:
TargetFilename|contains: C:\Windows\
filter2:
TargetFilename|contains:
- .jpg
- .jpeg
- .png
condition: selection and not filter1 and not filter2
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: fc4f4817-0c53-4683-a4ee-b17a64bc1039
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags creation events where an Image file with the name ending in \svchost.exe targets a path under \Personalization\LockScreenImage\. It further narrows matches to instances where the target filename is neither within C:\Windows\ nor contains common image extensions such as .jpg, .jpeg, or .png. Attackers may misuse this type of native file handling to place payloads in user-facing locations and evade straightforward extension-based detections, making it important to correlate process-related image naming with target paths and filenames from file event telemetry.
Known false positives
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.