Windows: Suspicious desktopimgdownldr Writes Lock Screen Images to Unusual Paths

Alerts on desktopimgdownldr-style lock screen image target writes to non-system paths with suspicious filename characteristics.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: "Windows: Suspicious desktopimgdownldr Writes Lock Screen Images to Unusual Paths"
id: cad72ede-7de6-4103-82a1-d92b40dcf0b4
status: test
description: This rule flags creation events where an Image file with the name ending in \svchost.exe targets a path under \Personalization\LockScreenImage\. It further narrows matches to instances where the target filename is neither within C:\Windows\ nor contains common image extensions such as .jpg, .jpeg, or .png. Attackers may misuse this type of native file handling to place payloads in user-facing locations and evade straightforward extension-based detections, making it important to correlate process-related image naming with target paths and filenames from file event telemetry.
references:
  - https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
  - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_desktopimgdownldr_file.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_event
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \svchost.exe
    TargetFilename|contains: \Personalization\LockScreenImage\
  filter1:
    TargetFilename|contains: C:\Windows\
  filter2:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - .jpg
      - .jpeg
      - .png
  condition: selection and not filter1 and not filter2
falsepositives:
  - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: fc4f4817-0c53-4683-a4ee-b17a64bc1039
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule flags creation events where an Image file with the name ending in \svchost.exe targets a path under \Personalization\LockScreenImage\. It further narrows matches to instances where the target filename is neither within C:\Windows\ nor contains common image extensions such as .jpg, .jpeg, or .png. Attackers may misuse this type of native file handling to place payloads in user-facing locations and evade straightforward extension-based detections, making it important to correlate process-related image naming with target paths and filenames from file event telemetry.

Known false positives

  • False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.