Windows File Events: Suspicious Executable File Name Creation
Alerts on Windows file creation with suspicious executable filename patterns, including .bat.exe/.sys.exe and deceptive path-based names.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- file_event
- Author
- frack113 (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-09-05
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule matches Windows file creation events where the target filename ends with specific suspicious executable-related patterns. Attackers often leverage masquerading or misleading extensions (e.g., .bat.exe, .sys.exe) and may attempt to drop executables into paths associated with common privilege escalation or persistence techniques using crafted filename strings. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the target filename for the create operation.
Reporting behind it
- medium.comhttps://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae
- app.any.runhttps://app.any.run/tasks/76c69e2d-01e8-49d9-9aea-fb7cc0c4d3ad/
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_executable_creation.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows File Events: Suspicious Executable File Name Creation"
id: 4ab7973b-71a7-4e1d-9fe9-04c5813c3e04
status: test
description: This rule matches Windows file creation events where the target filename ends with specific suspicious executable-related patterns. Attackers often leverage masquerading or misleading extensions (e.g., .bat.exe, .sys.exe) and may attempt to drop executables into paths associated with common privilege escalation or persistence techniques using crafted filename strings. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the target filename for the create operation.
references:
- https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae
- https://app.any.run/tasks/76c69e2d-01e8-49d9-9aea-fb7cc0c4d3ad/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_executable_creation.yml
author: frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1564
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- :\$Recycle.Bin.exe
- :\Documents and Settings.exe
- :\MSOCache.exe
- :\PerfLogs.exe
- :\Recovery.exe
- .bat.exe
- .sys.exe
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 74babdd6-a758-4549-9632-26535279e654
type: derived