Windows suspicious file download via file-sharing domains using Sysmon stream hashes

title: Windows suspicious file download via file-sharing domains using Sysmon stream hashes
id: b05483d1-0ffa-4b34-ad44-ff11afa07492
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    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows events where stream hash creation is associated with downloads from multiple common file-sharing and paste-hosting domains. It also looks for target filenames containing Zone markers appended to executable or script-like extensions, which can indicate malicious payload handling through alternate data streams or downloaded artifacts staged for execution. The detection relies on telemetry capturing the event fields that record the source content (domain strings) and the target filename used during stream hash creation.
references:
  - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015
  - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
  - https://fabian-voith.de/2020/06/25/sysmon-v11-1-reads-alternate-data-streams/
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_file_sharing_domains_download_susp_extension.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-24
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.s0139
  - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: create_stream_hash
detection:
  selection_domain:
    Contents|contains:
      - .githubusercontent.com
      - 0x0.st
      - anonfiles.com
      - bashupload.com
      - cdn.discordapp.com
      - chunk.io
      - ddns.net
      - dl.dropboxusercontent.com
      - ghostbin.co
      - github.com
      - glitch.me
      - gofile.io
      - hastebin.com
      - mediafire.com
      - mega.nz
      - onrender.com
      - pages.dev
      - paste.ee
      - pastebin.com
      - pastebin.pl
      - pastetext.net
      - pixeldrain.com
      - privatlab.com
      - privatlab.net
      - send.exploit.in
      - sendspace.com
      - storage.googleapis.com
      - storjshare.io
      - supabase.co
      - temp.sh
      - transfer.sh
      - trycloudflare.com
      - ufile.io
      - w3spaces.com
      - workers.dev
      - x0.at
  selection_extension:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - .cpl:Zone
      - .dll:Zone
      - .exe:Zone
      - .hta:Zone
      - .lnk:Zone
      - .one:Zone
      - .vbe:Zone
      - .vbs:Zone
      - .xll:Zone
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Some false positives might occur with binaries download via Github
level: high
license: DRL-1.1