Windows CreateStreamHash: Suspicious Downloads From File Sharing and Paste Websites
Identifies Windows stream-hash events tied to downloads from file-sharing/paste domains with Zone-tagged payload extensions.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- create_stream_hash
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-08-24
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows events that indicate stream hash creation where the destination content or domain matches common file-sharing and paste hosting services. It also looks for target filenames containing alternate data stream patterns that suggest execution-relevant file types embedded in streams (e.g., .exe, .dll, .vbs) with a ":Zone" suffix. Such activity matters because attackers often stage or hide payloads via public hosting sites and alternate stream techniques. The detection relies on telemetry that includes the stream hash creation context with domain/content strings and target filename details.
Reporting behind it
- ultimatewindowssecurity.comhttps://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015
- cisa.govhttps://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
- fabian-voith.dehttps://fabian-voith.de/2020/06/25/sysmon-v11-1-reads-alternate-data-streams/
- microsoft.comhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_file_sharing_domains_download_susp_extension.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows CreateStreamHash: Suspicious Downloads From File Sharing and Paste Websites"
id: b05483d1-0ffa-4b34-ad44-ff11afa07492
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- id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows events that indicate stream hash creation where the destination content or domain matches common file-sharing and paste hosting services. It also looks for target filenames containing alternate data stream patterns that suggest execution-relevant file types embedded in streams (e.g., .exe, .dll, .vbs) with a ":Zone" suffix. Such activity matters because attackers often stage or hide payloads via public hosting sites and alternate stream techniques. The detection relies on telemetry that includes the stream hash creation context with domain/content strings and target filename details.
references:
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
- https://fabian-voith.de/2020/06/25/sysmon-v11-1-reads-alternate-data-streams/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_file_sharing_domains_download_susp_extension.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-24
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.s0139
- attack.t1564.004
logsource:
product: windows
category: create_stream_hash
detection:
selection_domain:
Contents|contains:
- .githubusercontent.com
- 0x0.st
- anonfiles.com
- bashupload.com
- cdn.discordapp.com
- chunk.io
- ddns.net
- dl.dropboxusercontent.com
- ghostbin.co
- github.com
- glitch.me
- gofile.io
- hastebin.com
- mediafire.com
- mega.nz
- onrender.com
- pages.dev
- paste.ee
- pastebin.com
- pastebin.pl
- pastetext.net
- pixeldrain.com
- privatlab.com
- privatlab.net
- send.exploit.in
- sendspace.com
- storage.googleapis.com
- storjshare.io
- supabase.co
- temp.sh
- transfer.sh
- trycloudflare.com
- ufile.io
- w3spaces.com
- workers.dev
- x0.at
selection_extension:
TargetFilename|contains:
- .cpl:Zone
- .dll:Zone
- .exe:Zone
- .hta:Zone
- .lnk:Zone
- .one:Zone
- .vbe:Zone
- .vbs:Zone
- .xll:Zone
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Some false positives might occur with binaries download via Github
level: high
license: DRL-1.1