Windows: Suspicious Scheduled Task Modification via schtasks /Change /TN
Flags schtasks.exe executions that modify existing scheduled tasks (/Change /TN) using suspicious locations and command-line payload tooling.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-07-28
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies process executions of schtasks.exe where the command line includes both the scheduled task modification switch (/Change) and a task name (/TN). It further requires that the command line references common attacker-preferred or nonstandard locations and/or that it contains scripting or living-off-the-land binaries (for example cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript, certutil, wmic) commonly used to embed payloads into the task. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, using command-line contents to flag attempts to alter existing persistence mechanisms after task creation.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows: Suspicious Scheduled Task Modification via schtasks /Change /TN"
id: 295efdbd-e2da-46e9-ac09-34d4aee2007a
related:
- id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4
type: similar
- id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies process executions of schtasks.exe where the command line includes both the scheduled task modification switch (/Change) and a task name (/TN). It further requires that the command line references common attacker-preferred or nonstandard locations and/or that it contains scripting or living-off-the-land binaries (for example cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript, certutil, wmic) commonly used to embed payloads into the task. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, using command-line contents to flag attempts to alter existing persistence mechanisms after task creation.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_change.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-07-28
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_schtasks:
Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- " /Change "
- " /TN "
selection_susp_locations:
CommandLine|contains:
- \AppData\Local\Temp
- \AppData\Roaming\
- \Users\Public\
- \WINDOWS\Temp\
- \Desktop\
- \Downloads\
- \Temporary Internet
- C:\ProgramData\
- C:\Perflogs\
- "%ProgramData%"
- "%appdata%"
- "%comspec%"
- "%localappdata%"
selection_susp_images:
CommandLine|contains:
- regsvr32
- rundll32
- "cmd /c "
- "cmd /k "
- "cmd /r "
- "cmd.exe /c "
- "cmd.exe /k "
- "cmd.exe /r "
- powershell
- mshta
- wscript
- cscript
- certutil
- bitsadmin
- bash.exe
- "bash "
- scrcons
- "wmic "
- wmic.exe
- forfiles
- scriptrunner
- hh.exe
- "hh "
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1