Windows System Binary Execution From Unusual Location (Process Creation)
Alerts when common Windows system binaries run from an uncommon directory rather than standard system locations.
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windows-system-binary-execution-from-unusual-location-process-creation-e4a6b256
title: Windows System Binary Execution From Unusual Location (Process Creation)
id: 786bc3ba-aaa8-4888-956d-91bdc20fe223
related:
- id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd
type: derived
- id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where a Windows system binary is executed from a path that does not match common system directories. Attackers often rely on executing legitimate binaries from unexpected locations to evade detection and blend in with normal activity. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, matching specific image names and excluding executions from several typical Windows folders and known environments such as PowerShell and WSL.
references:
- https://twitter.com/GelosSnake/status/934900723426439170
- https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_exe_anomaly.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-11-27
modified: 2026-07-28
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \atbroker.exe
- \audiodg.exe
- \bcdedit.exe
- \bitsadmin.exe
- \certreq.exe
- \certutil.exe
- \cmstp.exe
- \conhost.exe
- \consent.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \csrss.exe
- \dashost.exe
- \defrag.exe
- \dfrgui.exe
- \dism.exe
- \dllhost.exe
- \dllhst3g.exe
- \dwm.exe
- \eventvwr.exe
- \fsquirt.exe
- \finger.exe
- \logonui.exe
- \LsaIso.exe
- \lsass.exe
- \lsm.exe
- \msiexec.exe
- \ntoskrnl.exe
- \powershell_ise.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \regsvr32.exe
- \rundll32.exe
- \runonce.exe
- \RuntimeBroker.exe
- \schtasks.exe
- \services.exe
- \sihost.exe
- \smartscreen.exe
- \smss.exe
- \spoolsv.exe
- \svchost.exe
- \taskhost.exe
- \taskhostw.exe
- \Taskmgr.exe
- \userinit.exe
- \werfault.exe
- \werfaultsecure.exe
- \wininit.exe
- \winlogon.exe
- \winver.exe
- \wlanext.exe
- \wmic.exe
- \wscript.exe
- \wsl.exe
- \wsmprovhost.exe
filter_main_generic:
Image|startswith:
- C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\
- C:\$WinREAgent\
- C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\
- C:\Windows\System32\
- C:\Windows\SystemTemp\
- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
- C:\Windows\uus\
- C:\Windows\WinSxS\
filter_optional_system32:
Image|contains: \SystemRoot\System32\
filter_main_powershell:
Image|contains:
- C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\
- C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\
- C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview
- \AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview
Image|endswith: \pwsh.exe
filter_main_wsl_programfiles:
Image|startswith:
- C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\MicrosoftCorporationII.WindowsSubsystemForLinux
- C:\Program Files\WSL\
Image|endswith: \wsl.exe
filter_main_wsl_appdata:
Image|startswith: C:\Users\
Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\
Image|endswith: \wsl.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_exe_anomaly/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags process creation events where a Windows system binary is executed from a path that does not match common system directories. Attackers often rely on executing legitimate binaries from unexpected locations to evade detection and blend in with normal activity. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, matching specific image names and excluding executions from several typical Windows folders and known environments such as PowerShell and WSL.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.