Windows Elevated Shell Execution via LogonId 0x3e7

Flags creation of privileged PowerShell or cmd.exe processes tied to an elevated logon context.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v7

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2023-11-23
Updated: 2026-09-15

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creations where a shell binary (PowerShell or Command Prompt) is launched with system privileges, indicated by a specific logon session (LogonId 0x3e7) and user name patterns containing AUTHORI/AUTORI. Elevated shell execution can be a key step for attackers to run commands with higher permissions, making it useful for privilege-escalation hunting. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields including process image/original filename, parent process context, command line (for a known silcollector case), logon ID, and user name.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Command Shell Spawned by SQL Server via Process Creation (via process_creation)

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Suspicious AutoHotkey Script Execution from User Writable Path by DarkGate

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Windows Elevated Shell Execution via LogonId 0x3e7

Pivot detection · T1059 · 9 related

Changelog

v7
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-09-15
v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-system-privileged-shell-spawn-via-elevated-logon-powershell-cmd-61065c72

title: Windows Elevated Shell Execution via LogonId 0x3e7
id: b8b60f6b-115a-46c4-8808-68fe257e210a
related:
  - id: 178e615d-e666-498b-9630-9ed363038101
    type: similar
  - id: 61065c72-5d7d-44ef-bf41-6a36684b545f
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creations where a shell binary (PowerShell or Command Prompt) is launched with system privileges, indicated by a specific logon session (LogonId 0x3e7) and user name patterns containing AUTHORI/AUTORI. Elevated shell execution can be a key step for attackers to run commands with higher permissions, making it useful for privilege-escalation hunting. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields including process image/original filename, parent process context, command line (for a known silcollector case), logon ID, and user name.
references:
  - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/SysmonEoP
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_elevated_system_shell.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-11-23
modified: 2026-09-15
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
  - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_shell:
    - Image|endswith:
        - \powershell.exe
        - \powershell_ise.exe
        - \pwsh.exe
        - \cmd.exe
    - OriginalFileName:
        - PowerShell.EXE
        - powershell_ise.EXE
        - pwsh.dll
        - Cmd.Exe
  selection_user:
    User|contains:
      - AUTHORI
      - AUTORI
    LogonId: "0x3e7"
  filter_main_svchost:
    ParentImage|endswith: \svchost.exe
  filter_main_silcollector:
    ParentImage|endswith: \cmd.exe
    ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /d /c C:\Windows\system32\silcollector.cmd configure
  condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1

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