Windows System Process Loads DLL from Suspicious or Permissive Paths
Alerts when a Windows system process loads a DLL from permissive or suspicious directories.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- image_load
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-07-17
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags events where a Windows system process located under C:\Windows\ loads a DLL from a suspicious or commonly permissive path. Attackers often use DLL side-loading or proxying to execute code while keeping the parent process looking legitimate. The detection relies on image load telemetry that provides the loading process image path and the DLL’s ImageLoaded path prefix.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows System Process Loads DLL from Suspicious or Permissive Paths
id: 0ab34594-dbf3-44d9-a6da-b392639bf5cc
status: test
description: This rule flags events where a Windows system process located under C:\Windows\ loads a DLL from a suspicious or commonly permissive path. Attackers often use DLL side-loading or proxying to execute code while keeping the parent process looking legitimate. The detection relies on image load telemetry that provides the loading process image path and the DLL’s ImageLoaded path prefix.
references:
- https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/iscsicpl_bypassUAC (Idea)
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_dll_load_system_process.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070
logsource:
product: windows
category: image_load
detection:
selection:
Image|startswith: C:\Windows\
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- C:\Users\Public\
- C:\PerfLogs\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c
type: derived