Windows UAC Bypass Indicator via sdclt Registry Key Manipulation

Alerts on registry set activity consistent with sdclt-related UAC bypass key manipulation.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
registry_set
Author
Omer Yampel, Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2017-03-17
Updated
2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags registry modifications tied to UAC bypass behavior by matching specific TargetObject paths associated with sdclt.exe registry entries. Attackers use this technique to influence elevated execution flows without triggering the typical user consent prompt. The detection relies on Windows registry set telemetry capturing the modified TargetObject fields and, in one case, a Details value matching a path pattern.

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Windows UAC Bypass Indicator via sdclt Registry Key Manipulation
Pivot detection · T1548.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.