Windows UAC bypass via changepk.exe launched from slui.exe with elevated integrity
Flags changepk.exe execution from slui.exe with High/System integrity to identify potential UAC bypass behavior on Windows.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-uac-bypass-via-changepk-exe-launched-from-slui-exe-with-elevated-integri-503d581c
title: Windows UAC bypass via changepk.exe launched from slui.exe with elevated integrity
id: 4b484a19-0234-4dd5-9bf7-d45ea0d8c5de
status: test
description: This rule matches process creation events where changepk.exe is started by slui.exe and the new process runs with elevated integrity levels (High or System). UAC bypass techniques often rely on trusted Windows binaries to obtain higher privileges without prompting the user. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including the parent process image path and the integrity level assigned to the spawned process.
references:
- https://mattharr0ey.medium.com/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
- https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-uac-bypasses-0xff16-86c2a9107abf
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_changepk_slui.yml
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \changepk.exe
ParentImage|endswith: \slui.exe
IntegrityLevel:
- High
- System
- S-1-16-16384
- S-1-16-12288
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 503d581c-7df0-4bbe-b9be-5840c0ecc1fc
type: derived
What it detects
This rule matches process creation events where changepk.exe is started by slui.exe and the new process runs with elevated integrity levels (High or System). UAC bypass techniques often rely on trusted Windows binaries to obtain higher privileges without prompting the user. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including the parent process image path and the integrity level assigned to the spawned process.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.