Uncommon ADWS (Port 9389) Connections from Non-Standard Windows Binaries
Alerts on unexpected process-to-ADWS (TCP/9389) connections on Windows to highlight potential directory discovery.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- network_connection
- Author
- @kostastsale (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2024-01-26
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
DiscoveryRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags network connections to Active Directory Web Services using TCP port 9389 when the initiating process is not one of the expected ADWS management binaries. Attackers may use ADWS to query or discover Active Directory data, so uncommon process-to-ADWS communication can indicate misuse. The rule relies on Windows network connection telemetry (destination port and initiated connection) and process image path context to identify unexpected callers.
Reporting behind it
- medium.comhttps://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
- github.comhttps://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday/blob/a9219dfcfd89836f34660223f47d766982bdce46/Discovery/ADWS_Connection_from_Unexpected_Binary-Win.md
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_adws_unusual_connection.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Uncommon ADWS (Port 9389) Connections from Non-Standard Windows Binaries
id: 35cf1576-467b-43b2-aa74-69cd88743748
status: test
description: This rule flags network connections to Active Directory Web Services using TCP port 9389 when the initiating process is not one of the expected ADWS management binaries. Attackers may use ADWS to query or discover Active Directory data, so uncommon process-to-ADWS communication can indicate misuse. The rule relies on Windows network connection telemetry (destination port and initiated connection) and process image path context to identify unexpected callers.
references:
- https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
- https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday/blob/a9219dfcfd89836f34660223f47d766982bdce46/Discovery/ADWS_Connection_from_Unexpected_Binary-Win.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_adws_unusual_connection.yml
author: "@kostastsale, Huntrule Team"
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: true
DestinationPort: 9389
filter_main_dsac:
Image: C:\Windows\system32\dsac.exe
filter_main_ms_monitoring_agent:
Image: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\
filter_main_powershell:
Image|startswith:
- C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe
- C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.ex
- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\
- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- ADWS is used by a number of legitimate applications that need to interact with Active Directory. These applications should be added to the allow-listing to avoid false positives.
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: b3ad3c0f-c949-47a1-a30e-b0491ccae876
type: derived