Windows: User Added to Highly Privileged Local/Directory Groups via net.exe or Add-LocalGroupMember
Flags net.exe or PowerShell commands adding users to privileged groups like Group Policy Creator Owners or Schema Admins.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2024-02-23
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies process execution where a user is added to highly privileged groups, specifically “Group Policy Creator Owners” or “Schema Admins,” using either net.exe with localgroup /add or PowerShell’s Add-LocalGroupMember. Adding users to these groups can enable privilege escalation and persistence by granting elevated permissions. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry with command-line arguments to match the relevant add-to-group patterns.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows: User Added to Highly Privileged Local/Directory Groups via net.exe or Add-LocalGroupMember"
id: b20e67b1-8330-48f1-a844-59d4d7615b01
related:
- id: ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e
type: similar
- id: ad720b90-25ad-43ff-9b5e-5c841facc8e5
type: similar
- id: 10fb649c-3600-4d37-b1e6-56ea90bb7e09
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies process execution where a user is added to highly privileged groups, specifically “Group Policy Creator Owners” or “Schema Admins,” using either net.exe with localgroup /add or PowerShell’s Add-LocalGroupMember. Adding users to these groups can enable privilege escalation and persistence by granting elevated permissions. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry with command-line arguments to match the relevant add-to-group patterns.
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_add_user_privileged_group.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2024-02-23
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_main:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- "localgroup "
- " /add"
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- "Add-LocalGroupMember "
- " -Group "
selection_group:
CommandLine|contains:
- Group Policy Creator Owners
- Schema Admins
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity that must be investigated
level: high
license: DRL-1.1