Windows: whoami.exe Executed by Privileged Accounts

Flags execution of whoami.exe from privileged-like accounts using Windows process creation events.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-01-28
Updated: 2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
- T1033System Owner/User Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies process creation events where whoami.exe is executed by accounts with privileged-like identifiers (AUTHORI, AUTORI, or TrustedInstaller). Attackers commonly use whoami to confirm the current security context during discovery or privilege-escalation workflows. Detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the OriginalFileName/Image path for whoami.exe and the initiating account name pattern in the event.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1033 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Whoami Discovery Spawned by Windows Script Host via Process Creation (via process_creation)

Suspicious Localized Administrator Account and Group Enumeration After Citrix Bleed Exploitation

Malicious Recon Output Staged in Qlik Sense Fonts Directory by Cactus Ransomware

Suspicious Host Reconnaissance Command Chain via cmd

Malicious Child Process Spawned From n8n Node Process

Suspicious Credential Enumeration via cmdkey List

Suspicious IIS Worker Process Spawning Whoami Reconnaissance

Suspicious Whoami Execution With Output Redirected to a File (via process_creation)

Possible Logged-On Session Discovery via Quser or Qwinsta (via process_creation)

Windows: whoami.exe Executed by Privileged Accounts

Pivot detection · T1033 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-whoami-exe-executed-by-privileged-accounts-79ce34ca

title: "Windows: whoami.exe Executed by Privileged Accounts"
id: e2a9c931-3772-4d95-9240-ca91342293af
related:
  - id: 80167ada-7a12-41ed-b8e9-aa47195c66a1
    type: obsolete
  - id: 79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies process creation events where whoami.exe is executed by accounts with privileged-like identifiers (AUTHORI, AUTORI, or TrustedInstaller). Attackers commonly use whoami to confirm the current security context during discovery or privilege-escalation workflows. Detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the OriginalFileName/Image path for whoami.exe and the initiating account name pattern in the event.
references:
  - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
  - https://web.archive.org/web/20221019044836/https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_whoami_execution_from_high_priv_process.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2023-12-04
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1033
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - OriginalFileName: whoami.exe
    - Image|endswith: \whoami.exe
  selection_user:
    User|contains:
      - AUTHORI
      - AUTORI
      - TrustedInstaller
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

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