Windows: WmiPrvSE.exe Spawning a Child Process

Identifies child processes created by WmiPrvSE.exe on Windows, highlighting potential WMI-based execution attempts.

FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
title: "Windows: WmiPrvSE.exe Spawning a Child Process"
id: 1bc578c6-082d-47d6-a1bf-a83d162f2dd1
related:
  - id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
    type: similar
  - id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
    type: similar
  - id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
    type: derived
status: stable
description: This rule flags process creation events where WmiPrvSE.exe is the parent process and a child process is spawned. Attackers often use Windows Management Instrumentation to run code indirectly under the WMI service context, so parent-child process relationships are a useful indicator. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the parent executable path/name and applying exclusions for specific logon IDs and common benign error handling (e.g., WerFault).
references:
  - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190815-RemoteServiceInstallation/notebook.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmiprvse_spawning_process.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-08-15
modified: 2023-03-23
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1047
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: \WmiPrvSe.exe
  filter_logonid:
    LogonId:
      - "0x3e7"
      - "null"
  filter_system_user:
    User|contains:
      - AUTHORI
      - AUTORI
  filter_wmiprvse:
    Image|endswith: \WmiPrvSE.exe
  filter_werfault:
    Image|endswith: \WerFault.exe
  filter_null:
    LogonId: null
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - False positives are expected (e.g. in environments where WinRM is used legitimately)
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where WmiPrvSE.exe is the parent process and a child process is spawned. Attackers often use Windows Management Instrumentation to run code indirectly under the WMI service context, so parent-child process relationships are a useful indicator. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the parent executable path/name and applying exclusions for specific logon IDs and common benign error handling (e.g., WerFault).

Known false positives

  • False positives are expected (e.g. in environments where WinRM is used legitimately)

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.