Windows WmiPrvSE.exe Spawning Suspicious Script and LOLBIN Child Processes

Flags WmiPrvSE.exe spawning script/utility executables like mshta or regsvr32, with command-line keywords where applicable.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: Windows WmiPrvSE.exe Spawning Suspicious Script and LOLBIN Child Processes
id: 34b941b8-25bb-417a-9d44-68c82a7cff91
related:
  - id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
    type: similar
  - id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
    type: similar
  - id: 18cf6cf0-39b0-4c22-9593-e244bdc9a2d4
    type: obsolete
  - id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows process creation events where WmiPrvSE.exe launches uncommon child executables associated with scripting and living-off-the-land abuse. Attackers may leverage WmiPrvSE as a trusted host to execute commands indirectly through interpreters or utility binaries such as certutil, cscript, mshta, msiexec, regsvr32, rundll32, verclsid, and wscript. It relies on telemetry from Windows process_creation, including parent process image paths and child process image and command line content to match suspicious relationships.
references:
  - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
  - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
  - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
  - https://twitter.com/ForensicITGuy/status/1334734244120309760
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmiprvse_susp_child_processes.yml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-11-10
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: \wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe
  selection_children_1:
    Image|endswith:
      - \certutil.exe
      - \cscript.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \msiexec.exe
      - \regsvr32.exe
      - \rundll32.exe
      - \verclsid.exe
      - \wscript.exe
  selection_children_2:
    Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - cscript
      - mshta
      - powershell
      - pwsh
      - regsvr32
      - rundll32
      - wscript
  filter_main_werfault:
    Image|endswith: \WerFault.exe
  filter_main_wmiprvse:
    Image|endswith: \WmiPrvSE.exe
  filter_main_msiexec:
    Image|endswith: \msiexec.exe
    CommandLine|contains: "/i "
  condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows process creation events where WmiPrvSE.exe launches uncommon child executables associated with scripting and living-off-the-land abuse. Attackers may leverage WmiPrvSE as a trusted host to execute commands indirectly through interpreters or utility binaries such as certutil, cscript, mshta, msiexec, regsvr32, rundll32, verclsid, and wscript. It relies on telemetry from Windows process_creation, including parent process image paths and child process image and command line content to match suspicious relationships.

Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.