Writing Of Malicious Files To The Fonts Folder (via process_creation)
This rule detects the hiding possible hostile files in the C:\Windows\Fonts\ location. This folder doesn't require admin privillege to be written and executed from.
SigmamediumWindowsv1
sigma
writing-of-malicious-files-to-the-fonts-folder-via-process-creation
title: Writing Of Malicious Files To The Fonts Folder (via process_creation)
id: a5d8658d-e9a0-52d0-a6ab-18ff87302d22
status: stable
description: This rule detects the hiding possible hostile files in the C:\Windows\Fonts\ location. This folder doesn't require admin privillege to be written and executed from.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-07-10
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1211
- attack.t1059
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'echo'
- 'copy'
- 'type'
- 'file createnew'
- 'cacls'
selection_2:
CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\Fonts\'
selection_3:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.sh'
- '.exe'
- '.dll'
- '.bin'
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.js'
- '.msh'
- '.reg'
- '.scr'
- '.ps'
- '.vb'
- '.jar'
- '.pl'
- '.inf'
- '.cpl'
- '.hta'
- '.msi'
- '.vbs'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.