WSL Process Execution of Kali Linux on Windows

Flags Kali Linux running under WSL on Windows using process creation image and command-line indicators.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2025-10-10
Updated
2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows Subsystem for Linux activity related to Kali Linux by matching process image paths and names associated with Kali WSL distributions and executables. Attackers may use Kali within WSL to run reconnaissance, tooling, or follow-on commands from a Windows host while blending into legitimate development/admin environments. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically Image, ParentImage, and CommandLine fields that include Kali WSL paths and identifiers.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.