Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
4,442 rules
Malicious PowerShell Download Rename and Execute Chain via Script Block
This rule detects a PowerShell script block that downloads a file into the public directory with Invoke-WebRequest, renames it to an executable with Rename-Item, and launches it with Start-Process. RomCom uses this exact chain after its Firefox and Windows zero-day exploitation to stage and run its backdoor. This indicates scripted payload delivery following exploitation.
HuntRule TeamWindowsps_scriptHigh386Premium2026-05-06Suspicious conhost Headless Execution for Hidden Window
This rule detects conhost launched with the --headless flag which suppresses the console window, a defense evasion technique seen in ACR Stealer intrusion chains. Hiding the console window conceals attacker command execution from the user during infostealer activity.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium211Premium2026-05-06Suspicious NetSupport RAT client32 Execution
This rule detects execution of client32.exe, the NetSupport Manager remote control client. The Horns and Hooves campaign delivered NetSupport RAT as client32.exe for remote access, and its presence outside sanctioned NetSupport deployments should be investigated.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium398Premium2026-05-06Malicious Active Directory Database (NTDS.dit) Extraction (via process_creation)
This rule detects extraction of the Active Directory database via ntdsutil Install-From-Media snapshots or shadow-copy access to ntds.dit, which yields every domain credential hash for offline cracking and forging. NTDS credential access is a high-impact technique in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report and a common precursor to domain-wide compromise. Detecting these extraction commands surfaces a domain-controller-level credential theft.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationCritical246Premium2026-05-06Malicious Domain Group Membership Change (via powershell)
This rule detects if a member is added to a domain group via PowerShell.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh385Premium2026-05-05Suspicious Scheduled Task Persistence Referencing AppData Roaming
This rule detects schtasks.exe creating a task whose action points to an executable staged under the user AppData Roaming directory, the persistence pattern used by TrickBot after copying itself into that location. Malware favors AppData Roaming because it is user writable and survives across sessions. Scheduled tasks launching binaries from a roaming profile path are uncommon for legitimate software.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium275Premium2026-05-05Suspicious Scheduled Task Executing VBScript via Process Creation
This rule detects creation of a scheduled task that runs VBScript through wscript or cscript, matching UAC-0099 persistence that fires a VBS loader every few minutes to relaunch a hidden PowerShell beacon. Adversaries chain the task scheduler with script hosts for resilient, low-profile persistence.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium404Premium2026-05-05Malicious PowerShell or Command Shell Spawned by SQL Server via xp_cmdshell
This rule detects the SQL Server process sqlservr.exe spawning PowerShell or cmd.exe, behavior produced when the GhostRedirector group abuses the xp_cmdshell stored procedure to run operating system commands. A database engine launching a shell indicates SQL-based remote code execution used for downloading tooling and establishing footholds on Windows servers.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh171Premium2026-05-05Malicious QEMU SSH Tunnel via Scheduled Task on Nonstandard Port (via process_creation)
This rule detects a scheduled task launching qemu-system-x86_64 to establish an SSH tunnel on nonstandard port 22022, a covert access technique observed after SolarWinds Web Help Desk exploitation. Observed in Elastic Security Labs telemetry where a TPMProfiler task runs QEMU to proxy traffic and evade network controls for persistent remote access.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh143Premium2026-05-05Malicious Event Log Clearing via wevtutil by The Gentlemen RaaS (via process_creation)
This rule detects wevtutil clearing the Security, Application, or System event logs, an anti-forensic action performed by The Gentlemen ransomware operators to erase traces of intrusion. Wiping logs hampers incident response and hides prior activity. Detection of log clearing is a strong indicator of hands-on-keyboard compromise.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh418Premium2026-05-05Suspicious Self-Deletion Batch Artifact by JadeProx TriBack Loader (via file_event)
This rule detects creation of the ~del.vbs.bat self-deletion artifact dropped by the JadeProx TriBack loader to remove its own components and cover its tracks. The distinctive double-extension cleanup file marks post-execution defense evasion. Detecting it exposes JadeProx anti-forensic activity.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventMedium152Premium2026-05-05Malicious Exchange Transport Agent Injection via Configuration File (via file_event)
This rule detects load an artifact in the Exchange transport agent.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventHigh3910Premium2026-05-05Malicious Remote Process Creation via wmic node call create
This rule detects wmic invoking process call create against a remote node. The CloudComputating group used this WMI technique to execute commands on remote hosts for lateral movement across the network, which is uncommon in routine administration.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh427Premium2026-05-05Suspicious Scheduled Task Running rundll32 DllRegisterServer Every Minute
This rule detects creation of a scheduled task that repeatedly invokes rundll32 against the DllRegisterServer export on a per-minute trigger. OysterLoader uses this technique to persist a malicious DLL dropped into the user profile. A minute interval task launching rundll32 with DllRegisterServer is rarely legitimate and typically indicates loader persistence.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh182Premium2026-05-05Malicious Service Abuse with Malicious ImagePath - Reg via PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh123Premium2026-05-05