Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
6,094 rules
Suspicious Kernel Mode Service Creation via SC
This rule detects creation of a kernel-mode service using sc with a kernel type flag, the mechanism used to load a driver during the ReadText34 ransomware incident as part of a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver attack. Registering a kernel service outside of software installation is anomalous. Attackers exploit this to load vulnerable drivers that disable endpoint protection.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium101Premium2026-05-03Suspicious Execution of PIF File as AutoIt Loader
This rule detects execution of a process image with the .pif extension, an abuse observed in a Lumma infostealer campaign where a renamed AutoIt3 interpreter named Riding.pif performed process hollowing to inject the stealer. It captures the use of an uncommon executable extension to disguise a script interpreter. Detecting this is important because .pif files launching as active processes are almost never legitimate on modern systems and frequently indicate masqueraded loader activity.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium367Premium2026-05-03Suspicious PowerShell Download of updserc Archive to AppData via ClickFix
This rule detects PowerShell downloading an archive named updserc.zip into the local AppData directory. This activity is part of a ClickFix phishing chain abusing Booking.com themed lures to stage the PureRAT loader. Pulling a named archive into AppData through PowerShell is an early loader step that precedes DLL side-loading and in-memory execution.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh392Premium2026-05-03ClickFix Paste-Jacking Command Written to RunMRU History (via registry_set)
This rule detects download or script-execution commands recorded in the Explorer RunMRU history, the forensic residue left when a user pastes a clipboard-injected command into the Run dialog during a paste-jacking or ClickFix attack. Adversaries rely on this manual execution path to bypass download controls, making mshta or PowerShell cradle strings in RunMRU a useful post-execution indicator.
HuntRule TeamWindowsregistry_setMedium166Premium2026-05-03Malicious Data Exfiltration to Restic REST Server over HTTP (via process_creation)
This rule detects the restic backup utility being pointed at a remote REST endpoint over HTTP to back up file-share directories, the exfiltration channel used in the Nitrogen BlackCat intrusion to stage stolen data before ransomware. Adversaries repurpose restic as a fast deduplicating uploader to attacker-controlled REST servers, so restic writing to a rest http repository is a strong pre-encryption data-theft signal.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh173Premium2026-05-03Suspicious Vulnerable Driver googleapiutil64.sys Loaded for BYOVD
This rule detects loading of a driver named googleapiutil64.sys, a renamed vulnerable Baidu antivirus driver deployed by Warlock ransomware operators to disable security tooling via Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver. The filename masquerades as a legitimate Google component.
HuntRule TeamWindowsdriver_loadHigh172Premium2026-05-02Obfuscated Encoded PowerShell Payload Deployed via Service (via security)
This rule detects deployed a service pointing to a hidden and encoded PowerShell payload. Some parameters are commented in case you would like to reduce false positives or make the rule more precise.
HuntRule TeamWindowssecurityHigh91Premium2026-05-02Malicious Axios NPM RAT Renamed PowerShell Execution via wt.exe
This rule detects a PowerShell binary copied to wt.exe under ProgramData and executed with a hidden window and execution policy bypass, matching the Axios NPM supply chain incident where a post-install hook drops a RAT. Renaming powershell.exe to wt.exe masquerades the interpreter as Windows Terminal to evade name-based detection. Execution of a masqueraded interpreter from ProgramData with bypass flags is a strong compromise indicator.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh388Premium2026-05-02Suspicious Fileless PowerShell Execution via Invoke-RestMethod Piped to IEX (via process_creation)
This rule detects PowerShell fetching remote content with Invoke-RestMethod and piping it straight into Invoke-Expression, the fileless delivery used by the SEO poisoning campaign impersonating Gemini and Claude Code installers. This pattern executes attacker-hosted script without touching disk. Some tooling uses irm iex legitimately, so review the target domain.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium377Premium2026-05-02Microsoft Defender SpyNet Reporting Disabled via Registry
This rule detects the Microsoft Defender SpyNetReporting registry value being set to 0, disabling cloud-delivered protection telemetry so malware runs with reduced detection. Huntress observed BlackCat affiliates degrading Defender before payload deployment. Turning off SpyNet reporting is a deliberate defense-evasion action rarely performed by legitimate administration.
HuntRule TeamWindowsregistry_setHigh3910Premium2026-05-02Suspicious New Rights Granted to an Account for Privilege Escalation (via security)
This rule detects grants new rights to an account in order to escalate privileges.
HuntRule TeamWindowssecurityMedium72Premium2026-05-02Malicious Mimikatz Driver Deployed via Service (via security)
This rule detects installs the Mimikatz driver to bypass the LSA protected mode (RunAsPPL) and dump LSASS process content.
HuntRule TeamWindowssecurityHigh2310Premium2026-05-02Malicious Impacket WMIexec Execution via SMB Admin Share (via security)
This rule detects remotely execute WMIexec via SMB admin share in order to escalate privileges.
HuntRule TeamWindowssecurityHigh103Premium2026-05-02Malicious Microsoft Defender Threat Exclusion Added - PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects scenarios where a threat exclusion is added to the antivirus in order to bypass its detection capacities.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh223Premium2026-05-02Suspicious Windows Service ImagePath Pointing to AppData Directory
This rule detects creation or modification of a Windows service whose ImagePath references a user AppData directory. Legitimate services rarely execute from per-user AppData paths, so this pattern commonly indicates malware establishing persistence as a service. Reviewing such services helps surface service-based persistence.
HuntRule TeamWindowsregistry_setMedium122Premium2026-05-02