Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
5,932 rules
Malicious EDRKillShifter Defense Evasion Tool Execution Linked to RansomHub
This rule detects execution of the EDRKillShifter loader by image name, a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver utility used by RansomHub affiliates to disable endpoint protection. The tool loads a signed but vulnerable driver to terminate security agents from kernel space, so any execution is a critical pre-ransomware defense-evasion event.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh180Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Cloud Exfiltration via Rclone Linked to INC Ransomware
This rule detects rclone invoked with copy or sync arguments toward a remote target, an exfiltration technique used by INC ransomware operators. Attackers use rclone to push stolen data to cloud storage before encryption, so command-line rclone transfers on servers and workstations are a strong exfiltration indicator.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium160Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Selective Archiving via 7-Zip Linked to INC Ransomware Exfiltration
This rule detects 7-Zip archiving that explicitly excludes executable, video, and virtual-disk file types, a staging pattern seen in INC ransomware data theft. Operators exclude bulky non-document files to keep exfiltration archives small and focused on sensitive documents, so exclusion switches on 7-Zip are a targeted collection signal.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium60Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Executable Launched From AppData Roaming Linked to GootLoader
This rule detects processes executing directly from the user AppData Roaming directory, a location GootLoader uses to stage and run its payloads. Legitimate installers occasionally run from AppData, so this pattern is heuristic, but user-writable execution paths are a common malware staging behavior warranting review.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationLow80Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Batch Script Execution From Temp via Command Interpreter Linked to GootLoader
This rule detects the Windows command interpreter launching a .bat file located in a Temp directory, an execution pattern used by GootLoader scheduled-task persistence. GootLoader registers a task that runs command.exe against a batch file dropped in Temp to relaunch its loader, so command-interpreted batch files from Temp are a strong indicator of this loader.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium40Premium2026-10-03Suspicious BrightMetricAgent Remote Tool Execution Associated With Volt Typhoon
This rule detects execution of brightmetricagent.exe, a remote support agent binary abused during Volt Typhoon intrusions for persistent access. Because this specific agent is uncommon in most enterprise fleets and was used as attacker tooling, its presence on endpoints should be verified against sanctioned software inventories.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium130Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Misspelled WMIC Binary Execution Associated With Volt Typhoon
This rule detects execution of a binary named wminc.exe, a misspelled masquerade of the legitimate wmic.exe tied to Volt Typhoon living-off-the-land tradecraft. The deliberately mistyped name is an anomalous constant that legitimate software does not produce, so any execution is highly suspicious and worth immediate triage.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh120Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Data Exfiltration via WinSCP Command Line in BlackSuit Ransomware
This rule detects WinSCP driven from the command line with an embedded session and scripted transfer commands, an exfiltration behavior used by BlackSuit ransomware operators. Attackers script WinSCP to push stolen data to attacker-controlled SFTP servers before encryption, so scripted WinSCP sessions on servers are a strong exfiltration signal.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium100Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Remote Process Creation via WMIC in BlackSuit Ransomware
This rule detects wmic.exe invoking process creation against a remote node, a lateral-movement technique used by BlackSuit ransomware affiliates. Attackers abuse WMI to spawn payloads on other hosts without dropping remote services, so remote wmic process calls warrant investigation.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh100Premium2026-10-03Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via BlackSuit Ransomware
This rule detects deletion of volume shadow copies through vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell as seen in BlackSuit ransomware operations. Adversaries remove shadow copies to inhibit system recovery immediately before file encryption, so this activity is a strong indicator of imminent ransomware impact.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh130Premium2026-10-03Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering to Disable Recovery via BlackSuit Ransomware
This rule detects bcdedit being used to delete recovery settings or force safe boot, an inhibit-system-recovery behavior observed in BlackSuit ransomware intrusions. Operators run this before encryption to prevent victims from booting into recovery and to weaken protections, making it a high-value pre-encryption signal.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh90Premium2026-10-03Suspicious LNK Persistence Dropped in Startup Folder
This rule detects creation of shortcut files inside the user Start Menu Startup directory which Spectre RAT uses to persist across reboots. Unexpected LNK files written to the Startup folder are a reliable indicator of autostart based persistence.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventMedium110Premium2026-10-03Suspicious Execution Delay via Ping to Loopback Address
This rule detects ping.exe being directed at the loopback address which Spectre RAT uses as a time based execution delay to evade sandbox analysis and space out its actions. Pinging localhost in combination with follow on execution is a common defense evasion trick seen in loaders and RATs.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationLow110Premium2026-10-03Suspicious MsMpEng Execution from Non-Standard Directory
This rule detects the Microsoft Defender engine binary MsMpEng.exe running from a directory outside its trusted install paths which indicates an infostealer masquerading as a security process to blend in. The legitimate MsMpEng only executes from the Defender platform directory so any other location is highly suspicious.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh140Premium2026-10-03Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
This rule detects wevtutil being used to clear or reconfigure Windows event logs which Evil Corp operators perform to destroy forensic evidence of their intrusion. Clearing event logs is a deliberate anti forensic action that legitimate administrators rarely automate on endpoints.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh90Premium2026-10-03