Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
766 rules
Malicious Firewall Deactivation - PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects disabled the Windows Firewall to evade defense.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh170Premium2026-09-02Malicious Service Creation - PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects create a service for persistence.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh20Premium2026-09-02ClickFix PowerShell In-Memory Execution via Invoke-RestMethod Piped to Invoke-Expression (via process_creation)
This rule detects the ClickFix golden pattern in which PowerShell retrieves a remote payload with Invoke-RestMethod and immediately runs it through Invoke-Expression, executing code entirely in memory. Adversaries leverage this download-and-run one-liner delivered through pastejacking overlays, making the paired cmdlets a reliable ClickFix execution indicator.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium90Premium2026-09-02OpenSSH Native Server Feature Installation (via powershell)
This rule detects enables the native OpenSSH server feature on Windows to perform stealthy lateral movement.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellMedium60Premium2026-09-02Malicious Service Abuse with Backdoored "command Failure" - Reg via PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects modify the configuration of a service to trigger an action when the service is crashed.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh80Premium2026-09-01PowerShell Encoded or Download-Cradle Command Line (via process_creation)
This rule detects PowerShell launched with an encoded command or an in-memory download-and-execute cradle on its command line, such as base64-encoded payloads or remote content pulled through Net.WebClient and piped into Invoke-Expression. PowerShell abuse is the single most prevalent technique in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report, used to stage and run payloads while evading disk-based controls. Flagging these command-line patterns catches the execution stage before follow-on activity.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh80Premium2026-09-01Masquerading sLoad Ramnit Loader Execution via PowerShell Running a Masqueraded Log Script (via process_creation)
This rule detects PowerShell launching with an execution-policy bypass to run a script masqueraded as a .log file, the loader behavior used by the sLoad downloader to execute the encrypted Ramnit payload in the drIBAN banking-fraud operation. Adversaries rename PowerShell scripts to log extensions so the interpreter runs untrusted code while evading extension-based controls, making early detection critical for catching the loader before Ramnit injection.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium40Premium2026-09-01PowerShell Spawned by SharePoint Worker Process After ToolShell Exploitation (via process_creation)
This rule detects the SharePoint worker process w3wp.exe spawning PowerShell, the post-exploitation execution pattern seen after ToolShell CVE-2025-53770 web shell deployment where decoded payloads are written to disk. Adversaries leverage the worker process to run commands under IIS context, making early detection critical for catching hands-on-keyboard activity following server compromise.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh60Premium2026-09-01Obfuscated IIS Worker Spawning Encoded PowerShell after SharePoint ToolShell (via process_creation)
This rule detects the IIS worker process w3wp.exe spawning a command shell or PowerShell with a Base64-encoded command, the post-exploitation behavior observed after SharePoint ToolShell exploitation of CVE-2025-53770. Adversaries run encoded PowerShell from the web server context to install webshells and stage further tooling.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh40Premium2026-09-01Obfuscated Encoded PowerShell Payload Deployed via Process Execution (via process_creation)
This rule detects deployed an encoded PowerShell payload via a process execution. Some parameters are commented in case you would like to reduce false positives or make the rule more precise.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh60Premium2026-08-31BITS Payload Downloaded via PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects downloads a payload by abusing BITS software. For more precise information, inspect "Bits-client" event log and search for ID 59 and 60.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellMedium10Premium2026-08-31Malicious WMI Spwaning PowerShell Process - WMImplant (via process_creation)
This rule detects wMIimplant.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh60Premium2026-08-31Obfuscated Encoded PowerShell Payload Deployed - PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects deployed a service pointing to a hidden and encoded PowerShell payload.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh50Premium2026-08-31Malicious Event Log Cleared Using Diagnostics - Via PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects clear the event logs.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh60Premium2026-08-31Malicious WMI Registration - PowerShell (via powershell)
This rule detects createsan instance of a WMI class using tools like WMImplant or PowerLurk.
HuntRule TeamWindowspowershellHigh50Premium2026-08-31