Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
145 rules
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via Dire Wolf Ransomware (via process_creation)
This rule detects use of wevtutil to clear Windows event logs, an indicator removal step performed by Dire Wolf ransomware across the Application, System, Security and Setup logs.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationMedium363Premium2026-07-21Malicious Nova Ransomware Note and Encrypted File Extension via File Event
This rule detects creation of the Nova ransomware note README_NOVA.me alongside files bearing the .xgWLckNV extension appended during encryption. These artifacts are dropped as Nova encrypts a host and demands ransom.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventHigh184Premium2026-07-14Malicious BlackByte Ransomware Host Marker via Control Panel Registry
This rule detects the international control panel values s1159 and s2359 being set to BLACKBYTE, a distinctive host-marking artifact created by BlackByte ransomware. BlackByte writes this value to tag infected systems.
HuntRule TeamWindowsregistry_setHigh132Premium2026-07-13Malicious Cicada3301 Ransomware Locker Execution via Command Line Key (via process_creation)
This rule detects execution of the Cicada3301 ransomware locker binary with its command-line decryption key argument, which the Repellent Scorpius affiliate launched remotely through PsExec to encrypt hosts. Passing the encryption key on the command line is characteristic of this Rust-based locker and indicates active ransomware deployment.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh193Premium2026-07-11Malicious Akira Ransomware Encryptor Command Line Flags
This rule detects execution of a binary using the stopvm and vmonly flags characteristic of the Akira Rust ransomware encryptor targeting ESXi. These flags instruct the tool to shut down and encrypt only virtual machines. Detecting the flag combination exposes the ransomware payload at runtime.
HuntRule TeamLinuxprocess_creationHigh161Premium2026-07-08RedCurl QWCrypt Ransomware Execution with Hyper-V Targeting Flags
This rule detects the QWCrypt ransomware binary launched with its distinctive command line flags that target Hyper-V virtual machines while excluding gateway hosts and disabling shadow copies during encryption.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh296Premium2026-07-06Suspicious DeadLock Ransomware C2 Proxy Request to prrq.php Endpoint (via proxy)
This rule detects HTTP requests to the /prrq.php proxy endpoint used by DeadLock ransomware to reach C2 proxy servers whose addresses are rotated through Polygon smart contracts per Group-IB. Adversaries route control and ransom-negotiation traffic through these proxy PHP endpoints, so requests to this path signal DeadLock C2 activity.
HuntRule TeamWebproxyMedium252Premium2026-06-26Suspicious Vulnerable Driver Load for BYOVD Abuse by DragonForce Ransomware (via driver_load)
This rule detects loading of the TrueSight.sys or RentDrv.sys vulnerable drivers that DragonForce abuses in a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver technique to call ZwTerminateProcess and disable endpoint protection. Attackers exploit these signed drivers to kill security agents from kernel space. Flagging their load exposes tampering with defensive tooling.
HuntRule TeamWindowsdriver_loadMedium4110Premium2026-06-25Lynx ransomware execution flagged by Windows command-line flags
Flags Windows processes whose command lines include "--mode fast" and "--noprint" associated with Lynx ransomware execution.
Swarup-Ingale, Huntrule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh30Free2026-06-25Malicious NTDS Database Dump via NTDSUtil in BlackSuit Ransomware
This rule detects ntdsutil being used to create an installation from media (IFM) copy of the Active Directory database, a credential-access technique observed in BlackSuit ransomware intrusions. Dumping NTDS.dit gives operators every domain hash for offline cracking and full domain compromise, making this a critical detection.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh493Premium2026-06-19Suspicious Password-Protected Archive Extraction of Everything64.dll by Elpaco Ransomware
This rule detects 7-Zip command-line extraction of a password-protected archive that deploys the Everything64.dll component. Elpaco ransomware, a Mimic variant, abuses the legitimate Everything search library for fast file enumeration prior to encryption. Password-protected extraction of this specific payload indicates staging of ransomware tooling on the host.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh423Premium2026-06-17Malicious Chaos Ransomware Ransom Note and Encrypted Extension (via file_event)
This rule detects Chaos C++ ransomware writing the ransom note READ_IT.txt into the AppData folder and appending the .chaos extension to encrypted files. Creation of these artifacts indicates active encryption by the locker. The malware also drops debug logs under the temp folder.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventHigh269Premium2026-06-12Malicious Ransomware Encryptor Execution with Password Gate (via process_creation)
This rule detects a binary launched with password and no-admin arguments characteristic of the Qilin ransomware encryptor. Operators executed the encryptor with a long password and a no-admin flag to skip UAC prompts during mass encryption.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh346Premium2026-06-12Suspicious Run Key Persistence via Masqueraded svhostss Value by Elpaco Ransomware
This rule detects creation of a Run key value named svhostss which masquerades as the legitimate Windows svchost process. Elpaco ransomware, a Mimic variant, uses this autorun entry to persist across reboots. The deceptive naming combined with an autorun context indicates persistence for a ransomware payload.
HuntRule TeamWindowsregistry_setHigh153Premium2026-06-12Malicious Akira Ransomware Encryption Execution (via process_creation)
This rule detects the Akira ransomware encryptor invoked with its characteristic path and share targeting switches. These combined command-line flags drive selective encryption across local and network locations. Detection here indicates active encryption and imminent impact on the environment.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh4210Premium2026-06-07