Sigma detection rules, expert-reviewed
Each one is checked against the reporting it came from before it is published, and shows the ATT&CK technique it covers, the telemetry it needs and where it falls short.
5 rules
Suspicious Double Base64 Decoded Payload Piped to Shell in CI (reviewdog Supply Chain)
This rule detects a base64 decoded payload being piped directly into a shell, the execution pattern of the injected reviewdog/action-setup install.sh that dumped CI runner memory. It matters because decode into shell in a build step is a common way supply chain payloads execute credential theft code without touching disk.
HuntRule TeamLinuxprocess_creationMedium143Premium2026-08-09Malicious PyPI Package Installation from Gleaming Pisces Supply Chain (via process_creation)
This rule detects installation of the malicious PyPI packages real-ids, coloredtxt, beautifultext, or minisound published by Gleaming Pisces to deliver the PondRAT backdoor. Installing these poisoned packages compromises developer and build systems through the software supply chain.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh358Premium2026-07-24Suspicious Child Process Spawned by 3CXDesktopApp via Supply Chain Compromise
This rule detects the 3CXDesktopApp.exe process spawning a command interpreter such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. During the 3CX supply chain compromise the trojanized client executed follow-on commands to profile the host and retrieve second-stage payloads after sideloading a malicious ffmpeg.dll. The VoIP client has no legitimate reason to launch shells.
HuntRule TeamWindowsprocess_creationHigh93Premium2026-07-15Malicious Bun Runtime Payload Dropped by Shai Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack
This rule detects creation of the setup_bun.js or bun_environment.js files associated with the Shai Hulud 2.0 npm supply-chain worm. A malicious preinstall script drops setup_bun.js which installs the Bun runtime and stages the large bun_environment.js payload for credential theft and self-propagation. These distinctive filenames written during package installation indicate the worm establishing execution.
HuntRule TeamWindowsfile_eventHigh122Premium2026-06-13Possible CI Runner Memory Scraping via Python Process Memory Read (tj-actions Supply Chain)
This rule detects a Python interpreter reading another process memory through /proc maps and mem, the technique the compromised tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action used to dump CI runner memory. It is important because this behavior harvests secrets and tokens from the runner and leaks them into build logs.
HuntRule TeamLinuxprocess_creationMedium161Premium2026-05-09