AWS CloudTrail CreateAccessKey by Another IAM User (Backdoor Key Creation)

Identifies AWS access key creation where the requester is different from the access key’s target user.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v5

Product: aws
Service: cloudtrail
Author: faloker (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-02-12
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1098Account Manipulation
Priv Esc
- T1098Account Manipulation
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags AWS API calls where an IAM user creates access keys (CreateAccessKey) and the request is attributed to a different user than the access key owner. Such activity can enable persistence by installing long-lived credentials for a backdoored account. It relies on CloudTrail event fields including eventSource, eventName, and the relationship between userIdentity.arn and responseElements.accessKey.userName.

Reporting behind it

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AWS CloudTrail CreateAccessKey by Another IAM User (Backdoor Key Creation)

Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

aws-cloudtrail-iam-createaccesskey-for-another-user-potential-backdoor-keys-0a5177f4

title: AWS CloudTrail CreateAccessKey by Another IAM User (Backdoor Key Creation)
id: 7cb6e3e5-335a-4093-8f3d-95d88e3179cb
status: test
description: This rule flags AWS API calls where an IAM user creates access keys (CreateAccessKey) and the request is attributed to a different user than the access key owner. Such activity can enable persistence by installing long-lived credentials for a backdoored account. It relies on CloudTrail event fields including eventSource, eventName, and the relationship between userIdentity.arn and responseElements.accessKey.userName.
references:
  - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/iam__backdoor_users_keys/main.py
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_iam_backdoor_users_keys.yml
author: faloker, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-02-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection_source:
    eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
    eventName: CreateAccessKey
  filter:
    userIdentity.arn|contains: responseElements.accessKey.userName
  condition: selection_source and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Adding user keys to their own accounts (the filter cannot cover all possible variants of user naming)
  - AWS API keys legitimate exchange workflows
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 0a5177f4-6ca9-44c2-aacf-d3f3d8b6e4d2
    type: derived

Convert

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