AWS CloudTrail UpdateLoginProfile: Password Changes for Other Users

Flags AWS IAM UpdateLoginProfile events where an account updates another user’s login profile password.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: "AWS CloudTrail UpdateLoginProfile: Password Changes for Other Users"
id: 932bcf69-9af1-43be-bf2b-04d405fd0e1e
status: test
description: This rule identifies AWS IAM Login Profile updates where the actor modifies a target user’s login profile, consistent with changing the console login password on behalf of another account. Such activity matters because an attacker with the iam:UpdateLoginProfile permission on other users can establish or alter credentials to gain console access. The detection relies on CloudTrail events with eventSource iam.amazonaws.com and eventName UpdateLoginProfile, using the requestParameters.userName to distinguish the modified user from the main actor identity.
references:
  - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_update_login_profile.yml
author: toffeebr33k, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2024-04-26
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
    eventName: UpdateLoginProfile
  filter_main_user_identity:
    userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate user account administration
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule identifies AWS IAM Login Profile updates where the actor modifies a target user’s login profile, consistent with changing the console login password on behalf of another account. Such activity matters because an attacker with the iam:UpdateLoginProfile permission on other users can establish or alter credentials to gain console access. The detection relies on CloudTrail events with eventSource iam.amazonaws.com and eventName UpdateLoginProfile, using the requestParameters.userName to distinguish the modified user from the main actor identity.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate user account administration

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.