AWS CloudTrail UpdateLoginProfile: Password/Authentication Profile Modified for Another User
Flags AWS IAM UpdateLoginProfile events where an account updates another user’s login profile password.
- Product
- aws
- Service
- cloudtrail
- Author
- toffeebr33k (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2021-08-09
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags AWS IAM Login Profile changes where the login profile is updated for a user other than the authenticated principal. Such activity matters because an attacker with iam:UpdateLoginProfile permissions on other users can change the password used to access the AWS console accounts that already have login profiles. The detection relies on CloudTrail events for iam.amazonaws.com with eventName UpdateLoginProfile and compares the target userName in request parameters against the calling principal identity.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "AWS CloudTrail UpdateLoginProfile: Password/Authentication Profile Modified for Another User"
id: 932bcf69-9af1-43be-bf2b-04d405fd0e1e
status: test
description: This rule flags AWS IAM Login Profile changes where the login profile is updated for a user other than the authenticated principal. Such activity matters because an attacker with iam:UpdateLoginProfile permissions on other users can change the password used to access the AWS console accounts that already have login profiles. The detection relies on CloudTrail events for iam.amazonaws.com with eventName UpdateLoginProfile and compares the target userName in request parameters against the calling principal identity.
references:
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_update_login_profile.yml
author: toffeebr33k, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2024-04-26
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
eventName: UpdateLoginProfile
filter_main_user_identity:
userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate user account administration
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
type: derived