Azure Audit Logs: User Added to Global or Device Administrator Roles

Alerts when Azure AD role-management events add users to Global or Device Administrator roles.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: azure
Service: auditlogs
Author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21' (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-06-28
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Priv Esc
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Defense Evasion
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags events where a user is added to administrative roles, specifically Global Administrator or Device Administrator, based on role-target resource IDs. Attackers commonly expand persistence and privilege by granting themselves or others high-impact admin roles. The detection relies on Azure audit log entries that include role management category, an add-member-to-role operation, and the affected role identifiers in the target resources.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1078.004 — drag to rearrange

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Azure Audit Logs: User Added to Global or Device Administrator Roles

Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

azure-ad-audit-logs-user-added-to-global-or-device-administrator-roles-11c767ae

title: "Azure Audit Logs: User Added to Global or Device Administrator Roles"
id: 48853aa1-81db-44d3-b7bf-2f868ee11dfc
status: test
description: This rule flags events where a user is added to administrative roles, specifically Global Administrator or Device Administrator, based on role-target resource IDs. Attackers commonly expand persistence and privilege by granting themselves or others high-impact admin roles. The detection relies on Azure audit log entries that include role management category, an add-member-to-role operation, and the affected role identifiers in the target resources.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#device-administrator-roles
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_ad_users_added_to_device_admin_roles.yml
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21', Huntrule Team
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    Category: RoleManagement
    OperationName|contains|all:
      - Add
      - member to role
    TargetResources|contains:
      - 7698a772-787b-4ac8-901f-60d6b08affd2
      - 62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 11c767ae-500b-423b-bae3-b234450736ed
    type: derived

Convert

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