Azure Audit Logs: Removal of Privileged Role Eligible Members

Flags Azure audit log events indicating bulk removal of eligible members from privileged roles.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: azure
Service: auditlogs
Author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-08-05
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1098Account Manipulation
Priv Esc
- T1098Account Manipulation
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags audit log events where a user is removed from a privileged role as either an eligible or permanent eligible member. Attackers may attempt to disrupt privileged access controls or alter role membership during staging, persistence, or cover-up. It relies on Azure audit log messages that explicitly indicate privileged role member removals.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Cluster-Admin Role Binding Creation (via audit)

Malicious User Password Change Using Current Hash Password - ChangeNTLM - Mimikatz (via security)

Suspicious Account Password Set to Never Expire. (via security)

Malicious Modification of a Computer Account SPN (via security)

Suspicious Massive Group Membership Changes (via security)

Malicious High Risk Active Directory Group Membership Change (via security)

Malicious Account Marked as Sensitive and Cannot Be Delegated Had Its Protection Removed (via security)

Malicious Host Constrained Delegation Settings Changed for Potential Abuse (Rubeus) - Kerberos Only (via security)

Malicious Host Set with Unconstrained Delegation (via security)

Azure Audit Logs: Removal of Privileged Role Eligible Members

Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

azure-audit-logs-bulk-removal-of-privileged-role-members-102e11e3

title: "Azure Audit Logs: Removal of Privileged Role Eligible Members"
id: ac63aceb-e596-4027-ae66-a772a9d31c02
status: test
description: This rule flags audit log events where a user is removed from a privileged role as either an eligible or permanent eligible member. Attackers may attempt to disrupt privileged access controls or alter role membership during staging, persistence, or cover-up. It relies on Azure audit log messages that explicitly indicate privileged role member removals.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_priviledged_role_assignment_bulk_change.yml
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    properties.message:
      - Remove eligible member (permanent)
      - Remove eligible member (eligible)
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legtimate administrator actions of removing members from a role
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 102e11e3-2db5-4c9e-bc26-357d42585d21
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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