Azure App/Service Principal Assigned to Entra ID or Azure RBAC Roles (Audit Logs)

Finds Azure role assignments where an app/service principal is granted, eligible, or scoped membership via audit log messages.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v5

Product: azure
Service: auditlogs
Author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow' (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-07-19
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1098.003Additional Cloud Roles
Priv Esc
- T1098.003Additional Cloud Roles
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags events where a service principal (application identity) is added as a member, eligible member, or scoped member to a role. Assigning privileged Entra ID or Azure RBAC permissions to an application can enable persistent access and privilege escalation without interactive user activity. It relies on Azure audit log messages indicating role assignment actions and targets service principals.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1098.003 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious MURKY PANDA Mail Permission Grant to Service Principal (via azure)

Malicious Assignment of a Privileged Azure AD Role (via auditlogs)

Suspicious Entra Cross-Tenant Access or External User Invitation via Azure Audit (via azure)

Suspicious Delegated Permission Grant to Entra Agent Access Scope via Azure Audit Logs

Suspicious IAM CreateLoginProfile For Root User via AWS AssumeRoot Abuse

Suspicious AWS IAM Privilege Escalation via AttachUserPolicy of Administrator Policy

Suspicious Member Added to Privileged Directory Role in Entra ID

Suspicious High-Privilege Microsoft Graph Application Role Grant via Azure Audit (via azure)

GCP Google Workspace: Application ContextAwareAccess Setting Changed

Azure App/Service Principal Assigned to Entra ID or Azure RBAC Roles (Audit Logs)

Pivot detection · T1098.003 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

azure-audit-logs-service-principal-assigned-azure-rbac-microsoft-entra-roles-b04934b2

title: Azure App/Service Principal Assigned to Entra ID or Azure RBAC Roles (Audit Logs)
id: 8a809790-eae9-4330-bf2a-c8fdd2a26fe5
status: test
description: This rule flags events where a service principal (application identity) is added as a member, eligible member, or scoped member to a role. Assigning privileged Entra ID or Azure RBAC permissions to an application can enable persistent access and privilege escalation without interactive user activity. It relies on Azure audit log messages indicating role assignment actions and targets service principals.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#service-principal-assigned-to-a-role
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_app_role_added.yml
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Huntrule Team
date: 2022-07-19
modified: 2024-11-04
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    targetResources.type: Service Principal
    properties.message:
      - Add member to role
      - Add eligible member to role
      - Add scoped member to role
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - When the permission is legitimately needed for the app
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: b04934b2-0a68-4845-8a19-bdfed3a68a7a
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

SplunkSPL