Azure Audit Logs: User Added to Privileged Eligibility Role

Alerts on Azure audit log events indicating a user was added as an eligible or permanent member to a privileged role.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: azure
Service: auditlogs
Author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-08-06
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Priv Esc
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Defense Evasion
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule matches Azure audit log events where a user is added as an eligible member for a privileged role (permanent or eligible). Adding privileged role eligibility can be used by an attacker to establish persistence and gain elevated access when conditions allow. It relies on audit log messages indicating “Add eligible member (permanent)” or “Add eligible member (eligible)”.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1078.004 — drag to rearrange

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Azure Audit Logs: User Added to Privileged Eligibility Role

Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

azure-audit-logs-user-added-to-privileged-role-49a268a4

title: "Azure Audit Logs: User Added to Privileged Eligibility Role"
id: 2a2ad4ae-abff-42c9-9bba-4fc638efef37
status: test
description: This rule matches Azure audit log events where a user is added as an eligible member for a privileged role (permanent or eligible). Adding privileged role eligibility can be used by an attacker to establish persistence and gain elevated access when conditions allow. It relies on audit log messages indicating “Add eligible member (permanent)” or “Add eligible member (eligible)”.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_priviledged_role_assignment_add.yml
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-06
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    properties.message:
      - Add eligible member (permanent)
      - Add eligible member (eligible)
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legtimate administrator actions of adding members from a role
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 49a268a4-72f4-4e38-8a7b-885be690c5b5
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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