BURNBOOK DLL Sideloading via SumatraPDF.exe Loading libmupdf.dll from User Directory (via image_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-08
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects SumatraPDF.exe loading a libmupdf.dll from a user-writable directory such as Downloads or Temp, the DLL side-loading behavior used to launch the BURNBOOK loader delivered in a ZIP archive during Operation DreamJob intrusions. Adversaries pair a benign PDF reader with a malicious library to execute their loader under a trusted process.

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BURNBOOK DLL Sideloading via SumatraPDF.exe Loading libmupdf.dll from User Directory (via image_load)
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.