In-Memory Rundll32 Execution Without a Command Line (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-27
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe running with no export or arguments on its command line, an anomalous state that legitimate use rarely produces and that commonly indicates code injection into a hollowed rundll32 process. Both System Binary Proxy Execution and Process Injection rank among the top techniques in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report, and an argument-less rundll32 is a strong heuristic for the latter. Detecting this pattern surfaces stealthy in-memory execution under a trusted binary.

Related detections9 linkedT1055 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious CRAT Injection Named Pipe ChromeUpdatePipe (via pipe_created)
Malicious Rundll32 Loading an Export From a User Path (via process_creation)
Renamed Regsvr32 or Rundll32 Loading a DLL With a Non-Standard Extension (via process_creation)
AsyncRAT Injector libPK.dll Written to Public Folder (via file_event)
Malicious Rundll32 DllRegisterServer Execution From a User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
IMEEX Framework DLL Execution via Rundll32 Loading imaadp (via process_creation)
FlawedGrace spawning threat injection target
In-Memory Rundll32 Execution Without a Command Line (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.