In-Memory XWorm Injection Target RegAsm Spawned from User AppData (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-17
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects RegAsm.exe launched from a process residing in a user AppData or Temp directory, the PE-hollowing pattern used by the Noodlophile campaign to inject XWorm into a trusted .NET utility. Adversaries leverage RegAsm as a signed developer binary and hollow it in memory so the RAT runs under a Microsoft-signed process, making early detection critical for exposing the injection before remote access is established.

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Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by PowerShell via PhantomVAI Loader (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading Non-DLL Image Extension File
Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by Command Shell for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Malicious Desktop Window Manager Impersonation From Non-System Path via process_creation
Suspicious .NET Utility Spawned by AutoHotkey Loader for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious csc.exe Spawned by Document Reader for Process Injection
Suspicious RegAsm Execution Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious .NET Utility Launched as Process Injection Target (via process_creation)
In-Memory XWorm Injection Target RegAsm Spawned from User AppData (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.