In-Memory XWorm Injection Target RegAsm Spawned from User AppData (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-17
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects RegAsm.exe launched from a process residing in a user AppData or Temp directory, the PE-hollowing pattern used by the Noodlophile campaign to inject XWorm into a trusted .NET utility. Adversaries leverage RegAsm as a signed developer binary and hollow it in memory so the RAT runs under a Microsoft-signed process, making early detection critical for exposing the injection before remote access is established.

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Suspicious AppLaunch.exe Spawned As Injection Target (via process_creation)
Suspicious JScript.NET Compiler Spawned by AutoIt for Process Hollowing
PureHVNC Process Hollowing into RegAsm Spawned by PowerShell (via process_creation)
Suspicious DotNet Utility Spawned by Script Host for Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious RegSvcs Reflective .NET Load from Fake Update Chain
Possible Process Injection Target RegAsm Launched Without Arguments via Process Creation
In-Memory Regasm Process Hollowing Spawned by PowerShell (via process_creation)
Suspicious AppLaunch.exe Execution as Process Hollowing Target
Suspicious ctfmon.exe Execution With Command-Line Arguments via PikaBot Injection
In-Memory XWorm Injection Target RegAsm Spawned from User AppData (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.