Kapeka backdoor execution via rundll32.exe with export ordinal #1 and -d on Windows
Flags rundll32.exe command lines launching a Kapeka payload from ProgramData/AppData Local using export ordinal #1 with "-d".
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2024-07-03
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule detects a Kapeka backdoor execution pattern where rundll32.exe is used to launch a backdoor payload stored under ProgramData or AppData\Local. The command line includes the backdoor module marker '.wll', invokes export ordinal '#1', and passes the '-d' argument. This matters because abusing rundll32 with ordinal execution helps attackers hide the real payload while blending into legitimate Windows binary usage. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry with the image path and full command line content.
Reporting behind it
- labs.withsecure.comhttps://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
- app.any.runhttps://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2024/Malware/kapeka/proc_creation_win_malware_kapeka_backdoor_rundll32_execution.yml
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Kapeka backdoor execution via rundll32.exe with export ordinal #1 and -d on Windows"
id: 9ce22e86-4c93-46a6-b3a7-848ada87c538
status: test
description: This rule detects a Kapeka backdoor execution pattern where rundll32.exe is used to launch a backdoor payload stored under ProgramData or AppData\Local. The command line includes the backdoor module marker '.wll', invokes export ordinal '#1', and passes the '-d' argument. This matters because abusing rundll32 with ordinal execution helps attackers hide the real payload while blending into legitimate Windows binary usage. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry with the image path and full command line content.
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
- https://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2024/Malware/kapeka/proc_creation_win_malware_kapeka_backdoor_rundll32_execution.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2024-07-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe
- OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE
selection_backdoor_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- :\ProgramData
- \AppData\Local
selection_backdoor_exec_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- .wll
- "#1"
- " -d"
selection_backdoor_exec_2:
CommandLine|contains: .wll
CommandLine|endswith: "#1"
condition: selection_img and selection_backdoor_path and 1 of selection_backdoor_exec_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e98f741c-6a5b-4c83-bc2a-1f4e58d07b12
type: derived